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Abstrat
With the advane of tehnology, urrent systems are beoming muh more powerful in omputation, muh
faster in data transfer and muh more abundant in data storage. However, what have been left behind are
the system reliability and manageability. Current systems still fail quite often in the eld. Understanding
the harateristis of system failures is a prerequisite to ome up with eetive solutions to address these
system problems. This thesis fouses on the failures introdued by inorret bug xes (a.k.a, buggy pathes)
and onguration errors.
Bug xing is done by humans, therefore it an also introdue mistakes, whih are inorret xes. These
inorret xes not only further aggravate the damage to end users, but also poison software vendors' repu-
tation. Therefore, we did one of the most omprehensive harateristi studies on inorret bug-xes from
four large operating system ode bases, inluding a ommerial OS projet. We studied the ratio and impat
of inorret xes, and found inorret x is a signiant problem that requires speial attention. We also
studied the ommon patterns of mistakes made during bug xing that an be used to alert the programmers
as well as to design detetion tools to ath these inorret xes. We nally studied the ode knowledge of
developers and found inadequate ode knowledge may inrease the hane of inorret xes.
Conguration error (i.e., misongurations) is another dominant ause of system failures. Unfortunately,
the harateristis of misongurations have been rarely studied in the past. Therefore, we took the initiative
to ondut a real-world misonguration harateristi study. We studied a total of 546 misonguration
ases, inluding 309 ases from a ommerial storage system deployed at thousands of ustomers and 237 ases
from four widely used open soure systems (CentOS, MySQL, Apahe HTTP Server, and OpenLDAP). Our
study overs several dimensions of misongurations, inluding types, auses, impat, and system reations.
Some of our major ndings inlude: 1) a majority of misongurations are due to mistakes in setting
onguration parameters; however, non-parameter mistakes are still sizable. 2) 38.1%∼53.7% of parameter
mistakes are aused by illegal parameters that learly violate some format or rules, motivating the use of an
automati heker to detet them. 3) a signiant perentage (12.2%∼29.7%) of parameter-based mistakes
are due to inonsistenies between dierent parameter values.
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Chapter 1
Introdution
With the advane of tehnology, urrent systems are beoming muh more powerful in omputation, muh
faster in moving bits and muh more abundant in data storage. However, what have been left behind are the
system reliability and system manageability. Current systems (espeially enterprise systems) are not only
non-trivial to manage, but still fail quite often in the eld. The stories [11, 37, 47, 89, 21, 63, 18, 7, 31, 14, 67℄
that relate to rashes, hangs, data orruptions or large-sale system outage an be easily found in the headline
of some tehnial news.
As one reent example [11℄ , on February 16th 2010, a small ISP network (alled Supronet) performed
a onguration hange to shift tra from one of its links to another ISP. The modiation resulted in
routing updates that have a very long AS Path. Though these updates ould be orretly handled by the
MikroTik routers deployed in Supronet. Unfortunately, Ciso routers ontained a bug that would ause them
to reboot when reeiving a long AS Path. Worse still, after rebooting, Ciso routers would try to reeive
those unexpeted updates again and reboot again, triggering ontinuous osillations. While Supronet,
whih is in the Czeh Republi, performed this onguration hange around midnight, it was mid-day/early
evening in east Asia and U.S. when the fault ourred. The result was a hundred-fold inrease in instability,
tra loss, and outages aeting nearly every ountry in the world.
Therefore, it is ritial to nd solutions to deal with system failures, onsidering that they not only bring
huge nanial osts to both system vendors and users [63, 7℄, but sometimes lead to irreversible damages suh
as human ausality [1℄. With the trend of loud omputing, the responsibility of maintaining desirable system
reliability and manageability will be largely shifting to the loud servie providers and loud infrastruture
providers. On one hand, the lients are beoming thinner and thinner and they will have muh less to worry
about. But, on the other hand, the systems inside loud will beome even more omplex. Then it will be
more diult to manage these loud systems and to guarantee their reliability. This shift will denitely
reate new hallenges for the whole industry to ght against system failures.
To prevent systems from failing, it is important to rst have a omprehensive understanding on the
harateristis of the failures. Generally, system ould fail due to three major auses: hardware faults,
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software bugs and operator errors.
Hardware faults are still a major issue that auses system to fail espeially when we are pushing the limits
of iruit for better performane. However, with the advane of tehnology, the urrent hardware is muh
more reliable than it was several tens of years ago and there have already been many systemati and mature
solutions (e.g., hardware veriation [53℄, redundant design [88℄, error orreting ode, fault injetion [46℄,
et.) to handle these faults. Therefore, we will not disuss the system failures due to hardware faults in this
thesis.
With the dip in hardware faults, the reliability of a system is more and more aeted by the other
auses. One of them is software bug. Software failures greatly redue system dependability. Sine software
programming involves great human eorts, as software beomes more and more omplex, it is inevitable
that human will make mistakes and introdue bugs into the system. Understanding the harateristis of
bugs an help us to explore more eetive software testing, debugging and diagnosis tehniques and ome
up with better software engineering methods to minimize the number of bugs that esape into prodution
runs. A substantial amount of researh eorts have been spent with the outome of a series of insightful bug
harateristi studies [32, 94, 95, 57, 60, 104℄. In this thesis, we will not try to ondut yet another general
bug harateristi study. Instead, we will dive in a sub-domain of software bugs that are both important and
not well studied by looking from another perspetive. These are the bugs that happen during bug xing (i.e.
inorret xes). These inorret xes are even worse than the original bugs, sine they further aggravate the
damage to end users and poison software vendors' reputation.
Unlike software bugs that are mostly introdued during developing (or xing) the system, the other
major ause to system failures is introdued while using the system. They are alled operator errors.
For example, a user an aidentally turn o his omputer by mistake or misonguring the system to let it
malfuntion. Operator errors are very hallenging to handle sine users an use the system in very diversied
ways. It usually takes a lot of eorts to diagnose an operator error in the eld. Therefore, Understanding
the harateristis of operator errors is rather ruial for us to design better tools to detet and diagnose
them, or even give us insights on how to improve system design to avoid operator errors fundamentally.
Though operator errors are of various types, a major soure of operator errors ome from misongurations.
Misongurations refers to that a user ongures, arranges, or organizes the system (or dierent system
omponents) in a wrong way whih leads to the malfuntion or failures of the system. Though people had
studied tehniques that an handle ertain types of misongurations [103, 25, 101, 99, 24, 110, 92, 54, 93, 50℄
in the literature, there has not been a omprehensive harateristi study on misongurations yet. In this
thesis, we will try to take the initiative to ondut suh a study.
2
1.1 The Charateristi Study on Inorret Fixes
As a man-made artifat, software suers from various errors, referred to as software bugs, whih ause
rashes, hangs or inorret results and signiantly threaten not only the reliability but also the seurity of
omputer systems. One a bug is disovered, developers usually need to x it. In partiular, for bugs that
have diret, severe impat on ustomers, vendors usually have to release timely pathes as soon as possible
in order to minimize the amount of system unavailable time.
Unfortunately, sine bug xing is also done by human, human mistakes are inevitable. Some xes either
do not x the problem ompletely or an even introdue new problems. For example, in April 2010, MAfee
released a path whih inorretly identied a ritial Windows system le as a virus [31℄. As a result, after
applying this path, thousands of systems refused to boot properly, had lost their network onnetions, or
both. In order to ompensate the ustomers who had suered from this buggy path, besides making a publi
apology on its website, MAfee agreed to reimburse the vitims for the osts to repair their omputers. In
2005, Trend Miro also released a buggy path whih introdued severe performane degradation [63℄. The
ompany reeived over 370,000 alls from ustomers about this issue and eventually spent more than $8
million to ompensate ustomers. The above two inidents are not the only ases in reent history. As a
matter of fat, there were many other similar events [18, 47, 67, 21℄ in the past whih put the names of big
ompanies suh as Mirosoft, Apple and Intel under spotlight.
We had also studied the seurity pathes released by Mirosoft in its seurity bulletin [8℄ sine January
2000 to April 2010. Surprisingly, out of the total 720 released seurity pathes, 72 of them were buggy when
they were rst released. They had either introdued new problems or had not xed the old problem om-
pletely, resulting in updated pathes. Considering the fat that these pathes were expeted to heal some
severe problems and were typially applied automatially to millions of users immediately one released, suh
inorret xes, espeially those introduing new problems, just like broken promise, would have enormous
impats and damages to end users as well as software vendors' reputation.
Few reent studies had been onduted on ertain aspets of inorret xes [27, 90, 82, 44℄. For example,
liwerski et al. [90℄ studied the inorret x ratios in Elipse and Mozilla. They found that large xes are
more error-prone and developers are easier to make mistakes during bug xing on Friday. Purushothaman et
al. [82℄ studied the inorret x ratio in a swithing system from Luent, but their fous was on the impat
of one-line hanges. Gu et al. [44℄ studied the inorret x ratio in three Apahe projets, but they foused
on providing a new tool to validate the path.
While these studies have revealed some interesting ndings, most of them foused more on inorret
x ratios and studied only open soure ode bases. This thesis goes muh beyond prior work, studying
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both ommerial and open soure, large operating system projets, and investigating not only inorret x
perentages, but also other harateristis suh as mistake patterns during bug xing, types of bugs that are
diult to x orretly, as well as the potential reasons in the development proess for introduing inorret
bug xes.
To the best of our knowledge, this thesis presents one of the most omprehensive harateristi studies
on inorret xes from large OSes inluding a mature ommerial OS developed and evolved over the last
12 years and three open-soure OSes (FreeBSD, OpenSolaris and Linux), The details of study, inluding the
methodology, the major ndings and the threats to validity are presented in Chapter 2.
1.2 The Charateristi Study on Misongurations
There are unountable numbers of systems in the world that need to be ongured in order to work normally
and deliver the right funtionality. However, most of these systems an not be ongured automatially so
that substantial human eorts have to be invested to do the onguration. As disussed previously, human
errors will inevitably arouse during this proess, whih leads to misongurations.
Misongurations (i.e., onguration errors) have a great impat on system availability. For example, a
reent misonguration at Faebook prevented its 500 million users from aessing the website for several
hours [37℄. Last year, a misonguration brought down the entire .se domain for more than an hour [89℄,
aeting almost 1 million hosts.
Not only do misongurations have high impat, they are also prevalent. Gray's pioneering paper on
system faults [43℄ stated that administrator errors were responsible for 42% of system failures in high-end
mainframes. Similarly, Patterson et al. [79℄ also observed that more than 50% of failures were due to operator
errors in telephone networks and Internet systems. Usually a majority of operator errors (or administrator
errors) are misongurations [75, 71℄. Besides being prevalent, onguration errors are also expensive to
troubleshoot. Kappor [48℄ found that 17% of the total ost of ownership of today's desktop omputers goes
towards tehnial support and a large fration of that is troubleshooting misongurations.
To ultimately solve the misonguration problem, substantial eorts and breakthrough in multiple re-
lated diretions, inluding misonguration detetion, misonguration diagnosis, misonguration tolerane
and misonguration testing, are needed. Reently, the study on misongurations has been making ap-
plaudable progress with a series of exellent researh work suh as [99, 103, 25, 92, 54, 50℄. To just name
a few, Peerpressure [99℄ uses statistis methods on a large set of ongurations to identify single ongu-
ration parameter errors. Chronus [103℄ periodially hekpoints disk state and automatially searhes for
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onguration hanges that may have aused the misonguration being troubleshooted. Confaid [25℄ uses
data ow analysis to trae the onguration error bak to a partiular onguration entry. AutoBash [92℄
leverages a speulative OS kernel to automatially try out xes from a solution database in order to nd
a proper solution for a onguration problem. Kardo [54℄ adopts mahine learning tehniques to extrat
misonguration solutions out of users' UI sequenes. Conferr [50℄ provides a very useful framework with
whih users an injet onguration errors of three types: typos, strutural mistakes and semanti mistakes.
This framework has already been used in Confaid [25℄.
Many of these work rely on some patterns or assumptions on misonguration errors whih are not
validated with a large amount of real world data. Furthermore, still some of fundamental questions about
misongurations remain unanswered. These situations make the researh on misongurtions like sailing in
the mist. Therefore, a omprehensive real world misonguration harateristi study ould greatly benet
all the above researh diretions and tools. Moreover, understanding the major types and root auses of
misongurations may help guide developers to better design onguration logi and requirements, and
testers to better verify user interfaes, thereby reduing the likelihood of onguration mistakes by users.
Unfortunately, in omparison to software bugs that have well-maintained bug databases and have bene-
ted from many software bug harateristi studies [33, 60, 94, 95, 57, 104℄, a misonguration harateristi
study is muh harder, mainly beause historial misongurations usually have not been reorded rigorously
in databases. For example, developers reord information about the ontext in the ode for bugs, the auses
of bugs, and how it was xed; they also fous on eliminating or oalesing dupliate bug reports. On the
other hand, the desription of misongurations is user-driven, the xes may be reorded simply as pointers
to manuals and best-pratie douments, and there is no dupliate elimination. As a result, analyzing and
understanding misongurations is a muh harder, and more importantly, manual task.
In this thesis, we take one of the rst attempts to study real world misongurations in both ommerial
and open soure systems, using a total of 546 misonguration ases. The ommerial system that we hose
is the COMP-A
1
storage system deployed at thousands of ustomers. It has a well-maintained ustomer issue
database. The open soure systems that we hose inlude the widely used system software CentOS, MySQL,
Apahe and OpenLDAP. We arefully examined the 546 misongurations, and disussed our results with
developers, support engineers and system arhitets of these systems to ensure that we orretly understood
these ases. Our study was approximately 21 person-months of eort, exluding the help from several
COMP-A engineers and open-soure developers. The study has revealed some interesting ndings whih we
will disuss in Chapter 3 in detail.
1
We are required to keep the ompany's identity ondential.
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Chapter 2
The Charateristis on Inorret Fixes
2.1 Overview
The existene of software bugs reates a huge threat to the reliability of all kinds of systems. Many bug
detetion tools [2, 56, 59℄ had been developed in reent years to help reduing the number of bugs. Unfor-
tunately, there are still an unlimited supply of bugs in software systems. To ure the buggy systems, bugs
have to be xed. Therefore, software developers usually alloate a signiant amount of time in bug xing
and sometimes their work performane would even be evaluated by how many bugs they have xed. Given
the objetives and prevalene of bug xing in software industry, it is a sad story that bug xing ould be
inorret. It an either introdue new problem or fail to x the original problem ompletely. For ustomers,
inorret xes are even harmful than the original errors. A single inorret x an be enough to ause severe
damage to both ustomers and software vendors. Customers will be upset if the x an't x the problem, and
they will be outrageous if the x even breaks some funtionality whih was working previously. For software
vendors, inorret xes not only let them suer big nanial loss, but also tarnish their image dramatially.
In Chapter 1, we had already disussed the importane of studying the harateristis of inorret xes.
While there is one question that needs to be disussed rst: what are the reasons for inorret xes?
char buf[256] ;
  …... (52 lines omitted)
sprintf( buf,   "You have an existing file %s.\
n", …)
sprintf( buf,   "You have an existing file 
%s",  Do you want to rename the existing 
keytab (a very long message ? )\n", …)
 





	


First fix Second fix
char buf[256] ;
char buf[400] ;
  …... (52 lines omitted)
sprintf( buf,    "You have an existing file 
snprinf(buf, sizeof(buf), "You have an…
%s",  Do you want to rename the existing 
keytab (a very long message ? )\n", …)
Figure 2.1: An inorret x example from FreeBSD. A part of the rst x appended a onsole message
with some additional information, unfortunately introduing a buer overow (The added lines are in bold
while the deleted lines are rossed out).
Mistakes in bug xes may be aused by many possible reasons. First, bug xing is usually under very
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tight time shedule, typially with deadlines in days or even hours, denitely not weeks. Suh time pressure
an ause xers
1
to have muh less time to think autiously, espeially about the potential side-eets and
the interation with other parts of the system. Similarly, suh time pressure does not leave enough time for
testers to ondut thorough regression tests before releasing the x. Figure 2.1 shows a real world example
from FreeBSD, the original bug x appended a log message with additional information. Unfortunately,
the xer did not pay attention to the buer length that was dened 52 lines upwards in the same le and
introdued a buer overow mistake.
SOCK_LOCK(so);
if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, PF_INET)) {
      if (so->so_pcb == NULL)    return;
          …... 
}
SOCK_UNLOCK(so);
 



 

	



First fix Second fix
SOCK_LOCK(so)
if (INP_CHECK_SOCKAF(so, PF_INET)) {
      if (so->so_pcb == NULL){
         SOCK_UNLOCK(so);  return;
       }     
        …... 
}
SOCK_UNLOCK(so)
Figure 2.2: An inorret x example from FreeBSD. The rst x tried to x a data rae bug by adding
loks, whih then introdued a deadlok as it forgot to release the lok by alling SOCK_UNLOCK before
return.
Seond, bug xing usually has a narrow fous (e.g., just removing the bug) omparing to general devel-
opment. As suh, the xer regards xing the target bug as the sole objetive and the major aomplishment
to be evaluated by his/her manager. Therefore, he/she would pay muh more attention to the bug itself
than the orretness of the rest parts of the system. Similarly, suh narrowly foused mindset may also be
true for the testers: tester may just fous on whether the bug symptom observed previously is gone, but
forget to test some other perspetives, in partiular how the x interats with other parts and whether it
introdues new problems. As shown in Figure 2.2, the xer just foused on removing the data rae bug by
adding loks. Though the data rae bug was indeed removed, the x unfortunately introdued a new bug:
a deadlok. This deadlok was obviously not aught by the reviewers and not disovered during regression
testing.
if (correct_sum()) 
if (correct_sum() &&  blk->count()) 
         blk_clear_flag(blk, F_BLK_VALID);



ﬀ

ﬁﬂﬃFirst fix Second fix
if (correct_sum() && blk->count()) 
if (correct_sum() && blk->count() 
&&!blk_scan_exist(blk,BLKS_CALC))
        blk_clear_flag(blk, F_BLK_VALID);
Figure 2.3: An inorret x that hadn't xed the problem ompletely. This example is from the
large ommerial OS we evaluated. The rst x tried to address a semanti bug by modifying the if ondition.
Unfortunately, the revised ondition was still not restritive enough.
1
we will refer the developer who xes the bug as the xer in the rest of the thesis.
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Importane of Inorret Fixes (Chapter 2.4, 2.5) Impliations
At least 14.8%∼24.4% of examined xes for post-
release bugs are inorret. 43% of the examined in-
orret xes an ause rashes, hangs, data orrup-
tions or seurity problems.
Although the ratio of inorret xes is not very high,
the impat of the inorret xes indiate that the
problem of inorret xes is signiant and worth
speial attention.
Among ommon types of bugs, xes on onurreny
bugs (39% of them) are most error-prone, followed by
semanti bugs (17%) and then memory bugs (14%).
Developers and testers should be more autious
when xing onurreny bugs.
Inorret xes to Conurreny bugs (Chapter 2.6) Impliations
Fixes on data rae bugs an easily introdue new
deadlok bugs or do not ompletely x the problem.
The synhronization ode added for xing data raes
need to be examined in more detail to avoid new
deadlok. Knowing all the aess loations to the
shared objets is the key to x data rae ompletely.
Fixes to deadlok bugs might reveal bugs whih were
hidden by the previous deadlok.
Fixers need to further examine the path after dead-
lok in ase there are some bugs hidden due to the
existene of the deadlok.
Inorret xes to Memory bugs (Chapter 2.6) Impliations
Fixing buer overows by statially inreasing the
buer size is still vulnerable to future overows.
It is better to use safe string funtions (e.g., snprintf)
or bound heking to x buer overow.
Fixing memory leaks an introdue dangling pointer
bugs when freeing the memory without nullifying the
pointer, and memory orruption when freeing some-
thing that should not be freed, or do not solve the
problem ompletely when forgetting to free the mem-
bers of a struture.
It is good to nullify the pointer after freeing the
memory. It is also important to learly understand
what and when should be freed to avoid overrea-
tion. Fixers should remember to free the struture
members when freeing a omplex struture to avoid
an inomplete x.
Human reasons to inorret xes (Chapter 2.7) Impliations
Comparing to orret xes, the developers who in-
trodued inorret xes have less knowledge (or fa-
miliarity) with the relevant ode. 27% of the inor-
ret xes are even made by xers who previously had
never touhed the les involved in the x.
Code knowledge has inuene on the orretness of
bug xes. It is dangerous to let developers who are
not familiar with the relevant ode to make the x.
Interestingly, in most of the ases, the developers
who are most familiar (5∼6 times of the atual x-
ers) with the relevant ode of these inorret xes
are still working on the projet, but unfortunately
were not seleted to do the xes.
Having a right software maintenane proess and se-
leting the right person to x a bug is important.
The ode reviewers for inorret xes also have very
poor relevant knowledge.
It is also important to selet a developer who is fa-
miliar with the relevant ode as the ode-reviewer.
Table 2.1: Our major ndings of real world inorret bug x harateristis and their implia-
tions. Please take our methodology and potential threats to validity into onsideration when you interpret
and draw any onlusions.
Third, the two fators above an be further exaerbated if xers or reviewers are not familiar with the
related ode. While an ideal xer ould be someone with the most knowledge about the related ode, in
reality it may not always be the ase to assign suh person to be the xer. Sometimes, it may be diult to
know who is the right person to do the x. Even if suh person is known, he/she may be busy with other
tasks or has moved to other projets, and is therefore unavailable to perform the x. Sometimes, it is due
to the development and maintenane proess. Some software projets have separate teams for developing
and maintaining software (for example, the latter is usually done by a sustaining engineer team). All these
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real world situations an lead to the ase that the xer does not have enough knowledge about the ode
he/she is xing, and onsequently inreases the hane of an inorret x. This might help explaining the
inorret x shown in Figure 2.3 from the ommerial OS that we evaluated. When we measure the xer's
knowledge based on how many lines he had ontributed to the le involved in the path, we found that he
had never touhed this le in the past, indiating that he may not have enough ode knowledge to x the
bug orretly.
Regardless what is the reason for introduing these errors during bug xing and why they were not
aught before release, their ommon existenes and severe impats on users and vendors have raised some
serious onerns about the bug xing proess. In order to ome up with better proess and more eetive
tools to address this problem, we need to rst thoroughly understand the harateristis of inorret xes,
inluding:
• what are the reasons for errors during bug xing? Are there any unique harateristis for bug xing
omparing to writing general ode?
• How signiant is the problem of inorret xes? More speially, what perentages of bug xes are
inorret? Comparing to ode added for features, is ode for xing bugs more likely to introdue bugs?
How severe are the problems aused by inorret xes? Are the answers to the above questions the same
for both ommerial and open soure software projets?
• What types of bugs are diult to x orretly? Are some types of bugs just more diult to x orretly
so that xers, testers and ode reviewers for these types of bug xes should pay more attention and eort
to avoid mistakes?
• What are the ommon mistakes made in bug xes? Are there any patterns among inorret bug xes? If
there are some ommon patterns, suh knowledge would help alerting developers to pay speial attention
to ertain aspets during bug xing. Additionally, it may also inspire new tools to ath ertain inorret
xes automatially.
• What aspets in the development proess are orrelated to the orretness of bug xing? For example, is
xers and reviewers' relevant knowledge related to inorret xes?
In this thesis, we did a omprehensive harateristi study on inorret bug-xes from large operating
system ode bases inluding Linux, OpenSolaris, FreeBSD and also a mature ommerial OS (NetApp's OS
for its storage systems) developed and evolved over the last 12 years. More speially, from these four OS
ode bases, we arefully examined eah of the 970 randomly seleted xes for post-release bugs and identied
the inorret xes. To gain a deeper understanding of what types of bugs are more diult to x orretly
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as well as the ommon mistakes made during xing those bugs, we further sampled another set of 320 xes
on ertain important types of bugs. We further studied the possible human reasons in the development and
bug xing proess. Our major ndings are summarized in Table 2.1. These ndings provide useful guidelines
for path testing and validations as well as bug triage proess. For example, inspired from our ndings, the
large software vendor whose OS ode was evaluated in our study is building a tool to improve its bug xing
and ode review proess.
While we believe that the systems and xes we examined well represent the harateristis in large
operating systems, we do not intend to draw any general onlusions about all the appliations. In partiular,
we should note that all of the harateristis and ndings in this study are assoiated with the types of the
systems and the programming languages they use. Therefore, our results should be taken with the spei
system types and our methodology in mind.
In Chapter 2.2, we present the bakground of our work and the related work. We then disuss the
methodology used in our study and threats to validity in Chapter 2.3. After that we present our detailed
results on the inorret x ratio in Chapter 2.4. Then we further study whih types of bugs are more diult
to x in Chapter 2.5 and what ommon mistakes ould be made in Chapter 2.6. After that we study the
human fators whih ould lead to inorret xes in Chapter 2.7.
2.2 Bakground
Studying inorret xes As briey disussed in Chapter 1.1, several previous studies [27, 90, 82, 44℄
had also studied inorret xes. Our work is omplementary to these previous studies. First, we fous on
large OS projets, while previous studies foused on ertain types of appliations. Seond, we study both
ommerial and open soure ode bases, while previous work studied only either open soure or ommerial
ode bases. Third, previous studies more foused on measuring inorret x ratios, while we went muh
beyond and also studied what types of bug xes are more error-prone, the ommon mistake patterns, as well
as the possible human reason in the development proess for introduing inorret xes.
liwerski et al. [90℄ proposed an eetive way to automatially loate x-induing hanges by linking a
soure ode repository to a bug database. They studied the inorret x ratio in Elipse and Mozilla and
also found developers are easier to make inorret hanges on Friday. Purushothaman et al. [82℄ studied
the inorret x ratio in a swithing system from Luent, but their fous was just the impat of one-line
hanges. Gu et al. [44℄ studied the inorret xes in three Java appliations, while their fous is to present
a tool whih an be used to verify pathes. Baker et al. dened inorret xes as x-on-x and visualized
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the x-on-x rates of the dierent modules inside a swith system of AT&T in [27℄. However, their work
foused on visualization. Besides, Beattie et al. [28℄ pointed out seurity pathes ould ontain bugs.
Human fators Human fators an play an important role in software quality. The inuene of ode
knowledge on general ode hanges had been explored in [84, 68℄. Mokus et al. [68℄ found that hanges
made by more experiened developers were less likely to indue failures. Rahman et al. [84℄ found le owner
with higher knowledge is less assoiated with x-induing ode. Our study foused on bug xes and measured
the knowledge of the xers who made the inorret xes in ommerial and widely used open soure OSes.
We also found knowledge has impat on the quality of xes, whih is omplimentary to their results. We
found 27% of the inorret xes are made by xers with zero knowledge, suggesting there might be some aws
in the overall bug assignment proess. Fritzy et.al. [41℄ studied whether a programmer's ativity an be used
to build a knowledge model about a ode base. Some work [20, 65℄ also studied human fators for designing
reommendation systems. Anvik et al. [20℄ suggested to assign xer based on bug history. MDonald et
al. [65℄ suggested to nd the person who last modied the ode. We proposed to assign xer/reviewer based
on ode knowledge dened at line level. Besides, other aspets of human fators had also been studied.
Meneely et al. [66℄ found that independent developer groups were more likely to introdue a vulnerability.
Bird et al. [29℄ found that a binary might be more buggy if more developers are working on it. Nagappan
et al. [70℄ studied the organizational struture and used it to build model to predit the failure proneness
in Windows Vista. Latoza et al. [55℄ studied developers' typial ativities and found that developers spend
nearly half of their time xing bugs. Aranda [23℄ studied whih oordination patterns are essential to the
solution of the bug.
Taming inorret xes There are dierent ways to solve the problem of inorret xes inluding prediting
or isolating buggy hanges [91, 52, 64, 109℄, path validation [44, 96℄, automati pathing [80℄ and regression
testing [87, 76℄. liwerski et al. built a plug-in for Elipse whih shows the risk of hanging a partiular
ode loation based on previous revision information. Kim et al. [52℄ also leveraged the historial soure
repository data to train models for prediting the orretness of a future hange. MCamant et al. [64℄
ompared operational abstrations generated from the old omponent and the new omponent to predit
the safety of a omponent upgrade. Zeller et al. [109℄ proposed automated delta debugging to loate the bug
introduing hanges. ClearView [80℄ automatially generates pathes without human intervention, whih
an redue the hane of inorret xes. Tuek et al. [96℄ used the tehniques of delta exeution whih an
validate pathes on-line eiently. Besides, regression testing [87, 76℄ is also a ommon pratie to ensure
pathes don't break the previously working funtionalities. Our study disovered some inorret x patterns
whih are helpful for deteting/exposing/avoiding inorret xes. We studied what mistakes programmers
11
should be aware of during bug xing, whih are also useful to design new detetion tools to detet errors
in xes. Besides, we also proposed a bug assignment proess based on ode knowledge, whih is being
implemented by a large software vendor.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Software Projets under Study
System LoC SCM Open Sr?
The ommerial OS ondential ondential N
FreeBSD 9.97M svn Y
Linux 10.94M git Y
OpenSolaris 12.99M hg Y
Table 2.2: The four OSes that our study uses. SCM is the Software Conguration Management system
eah OS uses. We also list the SCM used by eah ode base.
Table 2.2 lists the four ode bases we studied, inluding a ommerial, losed-soure OS from a large
software vendor (NetApp)
2
and three open-soure OSes (FreeBSD, Linux and OpenSolaris). We hose to
study OS ode beause they are large, omplex and their reliability is ritially important. Additionally, as
OS ode is developed by many programmers, ontains lots of omponents, uses a variety of data strutures
and algorithms, it ould provide us a broad base to understand inorret x examples.
The four OSes have dierent arhitetures. The ommerial OS is espeially designed for high-reliability
systems with many enterprise ustomers like big nanial ompanies and government agenies. It has evolved
for almost 12 years. Its bug traking system keeps the links to orresponding hanges and its soure ode
repository also keeps the reversed links, whih provides great onveniene to our study. Additionally, its bug
traking system has a eld to reord the ustomer impat when a bug auses failure at ustomer side and is
reported by ustomers. This eld is not available in the bug traking systems for open soure projets and
it is very useful sine it reveals the bugs whih have real impat in the eld. The other three open-soure
OSes have dierent origins. FreeBSD originates from aademia (Berkeley Unix). It is a large OS projet
with a long history. The projet started in 1993 and urrently is working on its 9.0 series. FreeBSD is known
for embraing a dierent design from UNIX and also famous for its high reliability and seurity guarantee.
OpenSolaris originates from a ommerial OS. It is based on Solaris [13℄ whih is a losed-soure operating
systems reated by Sun Mirosystems. Its origin is the UNIX System V Release 4 (SVR4) developed by Sun
Mirosystems and AT&T in the late 1980s. Linux ompletely originates from the open-soure ommunity.
2
Due to ondentiality agreement, we an neither mention the ommerial OS's name, SCM nor its LoC.
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It is a leading server operating system, and runs the 10 fastest superomputers in the world [6℄. In addition,
more than 90% of today's superomputers run some variant of Linux [10℄. We think the variety in data
soures would help us nd general software laws or interesting speiities.
These OSes usually have multiple branhes (series) in their OS families. We fous on those branhes
whih are both stable and widely deployed. For the ommerial OS, we hose the branh whih is most
widely deployed. For FreeBSD, we hose FreeBSD 7 series. For Linux, we hose Linux 2.6 series. For
Opensolaris, it has a dierent release model so we just studied the releases sine its 2008.5 version.
In order to further preserve the privay and reputation for the software vendor, we anonymized the results
in Chapter 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. The four ode bases will be just referred as A, B, C and D without
the mapping information dislosed. We know that suh anonymization may prevent us from making some
interesting omparison between open soure and ommerial ode bases, but fortunately we an still make
many other ndings like the ones summarized in Table 2.1.
2.3.2 Finding Inorret Fixes
The denition of inorret x: A bug x fx is dened as an inorret x if there is another following
bug x fy that xes either a new problem introdued by fx, or the original problem that was not ompletely
xed by fx.
One thing that we want to emphasize is that we onsider only xes to bugs, not any general or non-
essential hanges [49℄ (e.g., feature addition or renaming). This is identied by heking whether a x is
assoiated with a bug report. This sreening riteria is important to the delity of our study sine bug
reports often ontain rih information whih is important for us to understand the x. It is hard to obtain
a omplete piture from the bug x itself alone.
Unfortunately, the link between xes and bug reports is not always systematially maintained [26℄. For
the ommerial OS and OpenSolaris, the SCM (software onguration management) systems reord the link
between every bug report and every ode hange. However, for FreeBSD and Linux, suh links are only
doumented voluntarily by developers in an unstrutured way. To identify suh links, we use a method
similar to the methods used in [39, 90, 98℄. The main idea is to leverage the verbal information in the bug
reports or hange logs to reonstrut the links. For example, developers may write the bug is xed by hange
0a134fad in a bug report. Then we an link the bug to the hange 0a134fad.
After the above proess, we will have a set of bug xes linked with bug reports. We then randomly
selet a target number of bug xes and then semi-automatially hek whether eah one is an inorret x or
not. We all the proess semi-automati beause we use a two-step proess: rst step automatially selets
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potential inorret x andidates, while the seond step manually veries eah andidate.
Two tehniques are used in the rst step to automatially identify potential inorret x andidates.
First, we look at the soure ode overlap between hanges. This tehnique is similar to the methods used
in [90, 82℄. If there is soure ode overlap between two hanges, then the latter hange may be made to
orret the previous hange. There are expliit overlap and impliit overlap. The examples in Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.3 demonstrate the ases for expliit overlap, where the sprintf in rst x was expliitly overwritten
by the snprintf in the seond x. The example in Figure 2.2 illustrates the ase for impliit overlap where the
latter hange only adds some ode in the proximity of the previous hange. In Figure 2.2, three new lines of
ode were added without deleting or overwriting the ode from the rst x. Therefore, we hek soure ode
overlap as follow: if a latter hange fy overwrites or deletes the ode written in the previous hange fx or
fy just adds ode in the proximity (+/-25 lines) of fx, we regard fx as an inorret x andidate for manual
examination. The seond tehnique is to searh for spei keywords in the bug report and hange log of
eah x that may suggest an inorret x. For example, if we nd this path xed a regression introdued
by the x in Bug 12476 in the bug report linked with fy, we regard the x in Bug 12476 as an inorret
x andidate. In general, we nd the rst tehnique to be more omprehensive.
Please note that the rst step is only identifying andidates. We still need to manually examine eah
andidate, whih is the unique hallenge in our study. This step is the part in our study where we spent
the most of the time. We examined all the relevant ode related to eah x. In many ases, the relevant
ode has a muh bigger ode size than the x alone, and an over other les whih are not inluded in the
x. We also examined the bug reports and hange logs to get proof from developer's explanation. For some
xes, we even disussed with developers of these systems to ensure the orret understanding on them. Then
based on all the evidenes we got, we nally deided whether a x is inorret or not. Figure 2.4 showases
the whole proess.
Also note that the rst step may prune a few inorret xes out, espeially for those inorret xes
whose subsequent xes are in a ompletely dierent loation without any overlap at all (i.e. beyond the
+/-25 lines proximity). But we expet suh inorret xes are very rare as two subsequent xes to the same
problem usually has good loation proximity in terms of ode hanges. And we did try to relax the proximity
requirement to be within the same le but did not nd more inorret xes.
2.3.3 The Target Bugs to Study
In this study we used two sets of bug xes with dierent fouses.
Sample set 1: To get this sample set, we rst randomly sampled a total of 2,000 bug xes (500 from eah
14
Check 
Change log
Search 
Burt  body
Check 
Src overlap
Candidate Set
Manually
verify each
Incorrect
 Fixes
Figure 2.4: The whole ow to get inorret x samples.
OS) that are assoiated with bug reports. From these 2,000 bug xes, we further seleted ony those xes to
post-release bugs. Seleting suh post-release bug xes allows us to fous on xes to bugs that made high
impats to both ustomers and vendors. Post-release bugs are seleted after the random sampling instead
of before the sampling beause the manual eort in verifying all bug xes would be too huge. We then used
the proess desribed previously to identify and study inorret xes.
Sample set 2: This sample set is used to further zoom in ertain bug types observed in sample set 1
whose xes are most error-prone. Speially, we hose to study the xes to memory leak, buer overow,
data rae and deadlok bugs. However, it is diult to reuse the bugs in sample set 1, sine there are not
statistially suient number of bug xes for these types of bugs. Therefore, we deliberately sampled more
bug xes fousing on these four types. Speially, we used all the related keywords to searh for the bug
xes of a spei type. Keyword searh is enough to get these bug xes sine there are only limited ways to
name them. Then we randomly seleted 20 from eah type for eah ode base. In total, we sampled 320 xes
whih provide us a riher base-set to study the inorret xed patterns. This set is only used in Chapter 2.5
and 2.6.
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2.3.4 Measuring Code Knowledge
To understand why a programmer annot x a bug orretly, we also dive deeper into his/her knowledge
about the relevant ode. In this study, we measure ode knowledge by heking the umulative authorship
of eah line of ode at a partiular version, whih an be systematially measured. From SCM, we obtain
the authorship of eah line for a le at a given version by using ommands suh as svn annotate. Assume
a developer d, a le F, a funtion f and a version v, we alulate ode knowledge at two levels of granularity:
K_Filed,F,v =
The LoC written by d for F at v
The total LoC in F at v
K_Funcd,f,F,v =
The LoC written by d for f in F at v
The total LoC in the f at v
Then we an alulate a developer's K_File and K_Func for eah le and eah funtion at a partiular
version. We use perentage as the unit of K_File and K_Func. For example, K_Filed,F,v=75% means
75% of ode lines in F at version v are written by d. d does not need to ontribute all his ode in one
version and he may write these ode lines in any version that is not later than v. Both xers' and reviewers'
knowledge are measured in our study in this way.
2.3.5 Threats to Validity
Real world empirial studies are all subjet to validity problems, so is our study. Potential threats to the
validity of this study are the representativeness of the seleted software projets, the representativeness of
the inorret x samples, our lassiation proess and evaluation methodology.
Representativeness of software: Both ommerial and open-soure software are overed in this study.
So we believe that we have a good overage for at least OS ode. We do not intend to draw any general
onlusions about inorret bug-xes in all software, but some of the ndings suh as xers and reviewers'
knowledge would also apply to other appliations.
Representativeness of bug x samples: We studied only those bug xes that ould be linked to a bug
report. The set of xes Fn that annot be linked were not overed, and some of our ndings might not hold
in Fn [26℄. Fortunately, the results from the ommerial OS and OpenSolaris are immune to this threat sine
every bug x is linked to a bug report. Sine the results from FreeBSD and Linux show a similar trend as
the ommerial OS and OpenSolaris, whih may ease the onern on this threat for the other two OSes. As
disussed earlier, there is also a potential problem in our automati ltering proess, i.e., we an potentially
lter out an inorret x if its subsequent x does not have any proximity in ode loation. Fortunately our
exerises of relaxing the proximity onstraint did not disover any more inorret xes, whih indiates that
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the amount of missed inorret xes should be very low.
Threats of manual lassiation: Our study involves manual lassiation on bug reports and xes
whih an not be replaed by automati tehniques. Therefore, subjetivity is inevitable. However, we tried
our best to minimize suh subjetivity by using double veriation. For every inorret x andidate, we
examined all the information soures we ould have, inluding soure ode, bug reports, hange logs, et.
Besides, for some xes we also disussed with developers of these systems to ensure the orret understanding
on them. Sine we manually examined eah inorret x andidate and lassify it as inorret only if we
have onrete evidene, we are ondent that the number of false positives should be very low.
Limitation in measuring the knowledge: The way we measure ode knowledge is relatively preliminary
sine we only want to hek the xers and reviewers' knowledge in a oarse-grain, qualitative way. A more
sophistiated knowledge model might provide us more aurate results in Chapter 2.7, whih remains as our
future study.
2.4 Is Inorret Fix Really a Signiant Problem?
The ratio of inorret xes among all bug xes and the impat of bugs introdued by inorret xes are
important for us to aurately understand whether inorret bug x is a signiant problem. As desribed
in Chapter 2.3, we rst randomly sampled 2,000 bug xes from the four OSes (500 from eah OS), among
them 970 are xes to post-release bugs. The reason we fous on xes for post-release bugs is that those bugs
hit the end users and generally have higher impat, hene software vendor and developers may spend more
eorts in xing them. On the other hand, the ode base is usually not stable before release. Thus the ratio
of inorret xes for before-release bugs may not represent the exat eorts that developers put into xing
bugs.
System
# of Post-release # of Inorret
Ratio
bug xes xes
A 189 39 20.6%±3.0%
B 309 46 14.8%±2.9%
C 267 41 15.3%±2.6%
D 205 50 24.4%±3.7%
Table 2.3: The ratio of inorret xes on post-release bugs in the four OSes. A 95% ondene
interval is used.
Table 2.3 shows the ratio of inorret xes is 14.8%∼24.4% among the four OSes. As disussed in
Chapter 2.3.5, this is only a lower-bound estimation. Considering that the xes on post-release bugs would
be applied by a lot of ustomers and users, even the ratio an still have signiant impat on them as well
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as the software vendors. Sine regression testing had already been applied before releasing the xes, it also
indiates general testing tehniques may need to be tailored to be more eetive in apturing the errors in
pathes.
System dfix dwhole dwhole/dfix
A 171.4 6077.6 36x
B 840.6 4045.7 5x
C 561.2 6239.0 11x
D 712.7 3530.9 5x
Table 2.4: The bug density measured in how many LoC ontain a bug. dfix and dwhole represent
the bug density in bug xes and whole ode base respetively.
We also ompared the bug density in bug xes with the whole ode base. Table 2.4 shows this result. We
found in all four OSes, the bug density in xes is at least 5 times of the whole ode base. In some OS projet,
the bug density in bug xes an be 36 times of the whole ode base. This indiates writing bug-xing pathes
might be more error-prone. However, we used a simplied way to alulate the bug density. Therefore the
results in Table 2.4 might not be aurate enough and should be taken with aution.
We further studied the impat of the bugs introdued by the examined inorret xes. We judge the
impat based on the symptoms desribed in the bug reports. to see whether they ould be milder or more
severe than the original bugs. We found 14.0% of them introdued rash, 8.4% aused system to hang,
15.4% led to data orruption or data loss, 5.6% aused seurity problem, 7.0% degraded the performane, and
45.1% introdued inorret funtionality. Some bugs introdued are atually more severe than the original
bugs. Moreover, for some bugs, they ould even be inorretly xed for several times.
Finding: At least 14.8%∼24.4% of the bug xes are inorret. Moreover, 43% of
the inorret xes resulted in severe bugs that aused rash, hang, data orruption
or seurity problems.
Impliation: Inorret x is indeed a signiant problem that requires speial
attentions from software vendors.
2.5 Whih Types of Bugs Are More Diult to Fix Corretly?
In this setion, we study whih types of bugs are more likely to introdue inorret xes. We lassied all
the 970 sampled xes into three ategories based on the bugs they x: memory bug, onurreny bug or
semanti bug. Semanti bugs are those bugs that an be lassied as neither memory nor onurreny bug
and are usually appliation spei problems. This lassiation is adopted from previous literature [57, 61℄.
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System Conurreny Memory Semanti
A 4/13 (31%) 3/17 (18%) 32/159 (20%)
B 9/21 (43%) 5/44 (13%) 32/244 (13%)
C 7/19 (37%) 6/43 (14%) 28/205 (14%)
D 10/23 (44%) 5/30 (17%) 35/152 (23%)
Overall 30/76 (39%) 19/134 (14%) 127/760 (17%)
Table 2.5: The number of inorret xes among all the xes and the inorret x ratio for the
three ategories of bugs in the four OSes.
Table 2.5 shows the ratio of inorret xes to eah type of bug. In omparison, onurreny bugs have the
largest inorret x ratio (39% overall), indiating onurreny bugs are the most diult to x. Semanti
bugs and memory bugs have similar ratio, 17% and 14%, respetively.
We fous on studying onurreny bugs and memory bugs, while only providing some high level disussion
on semanti bugs (Chapter 2.6.5). This is beause semanti bugs are of very diverse root auses so that it
is diult to observe some general patterns from their xes and the mistakes in the xes. Also onurreny
bugs and memory bugs usually have higher impat (e.g., ausing rash or data orruption) than semanti
bugs (e.g., ausing funtionality problem).
Bug Types and Their Perentages
data rae 33% deadlok 29%
buer overow 8% memory leak 6%
uninitialized read 4% null pointer deref 4%
Table 2.6: The most observed bug types among all the onurreny bugs and memory bugs
being xed inorretly. Only top six are shown.
To selet the important types of bugs for a detailed study, we further zoomed into all the onurreny
bugs and memory bugs that were xed inorretly to see whih types are most observed. The result is shown
in Table 2.6. Among all the bug types, data rae (33%), deadlok (29%) are the top two types that have
most inorret xes among onurreny bugs. Buer overow (8%) and memory leak (6%) are the top two
types that have most inorret xes among memory bugs. Therefore, we just foused on the harateristis
of bug xes to these four types of bugs.
Table 2.7 further shows the ratio of inorret xes for these four types of bugs. The result is from 320
xes only to these bug types (sample set 2 mentioned in Chapter 2.3.3), where for eah type we randomly
sampled 20 xes from eah ode base. We use this data set instead of the one used above beause among the
original 970 xes (sample set 1 mentioned in Chapter 2.3.3), there are not statistially suient number of
bug xes for these four types of bugs. In other words, in this study we deliberately sampled more bug xes
fousing on these four types. sample set 2 provides us a riher base-set of inorret xes to ondut our ase
studies in Chapter 2.6. As indiated in Table 2.7, xes to data rae and deadlok are most error-prone, with
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System
Bug types
rae deadlok buf overow mem leak
A 9/20 (45%) 5/20 (25%) 2/20 (10%) 1/20 (5%)
B 11/20 (55%) 6/20 (30%) 1/20 (5%) 3/20(15%)
C 11/20 (55%) 8/20 (40%) 3/20 (15%) 0/20 (0%)
D 8/20 (40%) 9/20 (45%) 1/20 (5%) 4/20 (20%)
All 39/80 (49%) 28/80 (35%) 7/80 (9%) 8/80 (10%)
Table 2.7: The number of inorret xes among the all the xes and the inorret x ratio
for the four important types of bugs from sample set 2. The format is inorret/all sampled xes
(ratio).
an inorret x ratio of 49% and 35% respetively, whih is generally 4x∼6x of buer overow and memory
leak.
Finding: Conurreny bugs are the most diult (39%) to x right. Among
onurreny and memory bugs whih were xed inorretly, the four most observed
bug types are: data rae, deadlok, buer overow and memory leak.
Impliation: Developers and testers should be more autious when xing on-
urreny bugs. The alloation of xing and testing resoures ould onsider the
types of bugs to be xed.
2.6 Inorret Fix Patterns
After understanding whih types of bugs are more diult to x right, it would be interesting to study the
ommon mistakes (patterns) when xing a partiular type of bugs and the onsequene introdued by those
inorret xes. Though bug x patterns had already been studied in [51, 78℄, few had studied the patterns
of inorret xes before. In this setion, we use the inorret x examples got from sample set 2. Generally,
we nd there are two types of inorret xes: inomplete xes and introduing new problems, while eah type
of bug also has its own inorret x patterns. We also disuss tehniques to detet or reveal these mistakes
by either extending urrent tehniques or suggesting new approahes.
2.6.1 Fixing Data Raes
The most ommon pratie for xing data rae is to add synhronization primitives (e.g., loks) to guard
shared resoures with mutual exlusion. However, delivering a orret x requires deep reasoning on all the
side-eets of the newly added synhronization, whih is often error-prone.
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FXP_LOCK(sc);
ether_ifdetach(&sc->arpcom.ac_if);
…..
bus_teardown_intr(sc->dev, ...);
FXP_UNLOCK(sc);
 






		

First fix Second fix
FXP_LOCK(sc);
ether_ifdetach(&sc->arpcom.ac_if);
…..
FXP_UNLOCK(sc);
bus_teardown_intr(sc->dev, ...);
Figure 2.5: Inorret x to a data rae introdued a deadlok. The funtion bus_teardown_intr
annot be alled with lok held, otherwise deadlok will be introdued.
Speially, adding loks might introdue deadlok. This inorret x pattern is observed in all the four
ode bases we evaluated and in 16.4% (6 out of 39) of the inorret xes to data rae bugs. Figure 2.5
shows one of the examples. In the rst x, a lok s was added to avoid a rae. However, the funtion
bus_teardown_intr is not supposed to be alled inside the ritial setion, sine it an lead to deadlok.
Unfortunately, developers were not aware of this rule and made the inorret x. To x this deadlok,
bus_teardown_intr was moved out of the ritial setion.
Figure 2.2 (in Chapter 2.1) is another example of this pattern that xing data rae introdues deadlok.
The xer forgot to release the lok via SOCK_UNLOCK before a return statement therefore a deadlok
happened.
Impliations: When adding synhronization primitives, xers need to make sure the newly added primi-
tives (e.g., lok) will not introdue deadloks with the existing synhronization ode. This an be heked by
extending deadlok detetors to only fous on the synhronization primitives newly added. Besides, lok and
unloks should be added in pairs along all the exeution paths in the newly formed atomi region. This an
be heked automatially by extending some existing path-sensitive bug detetion tools suh as RaerX [35℄
or PR-Miner [58℄ to only san the ode regions touhed by the x.
spin_lock_irqsave(&hcall_lock,flag);
plpar_hcall9(…);  
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hcall_lock, flag);
…...
plpar_hcall9_norets(…);
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spin_lock_irqsave(&hcall_lock,flag);
plpar_hcall9(…);  
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hcall_lock, flag);
…...
spin_lock_irqsave(&hcall_lock,flag);
plpar_hcall9_norets(…);  
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hcall_lock, flag);
Figure 2.6: Fix to a data rae was not omplete. The rst x only added loks to protet funtion
plpar_hall9, while forgot to protet plpar_hall9_noret (whih ontains the aess to the same shared
objets in plpar_hall9).
Fixing data raes ould be inomplete suh that not all the data raes are xed. This inorret x pattern
is observed in three of the ode bases we evaluated and in 10.2% (4 out of 39) of the inorret xes to data
rae bugs. For example, as shown in Figure 2.6, when adding loks, the developer forgets to lok all the
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plaes she should lok.
Impliations: For a omplete x to data rae, it is important to know all the aesses to the shared
objets whih ould rae with eah others. While this task might be daunting for manual eorts, inomplete
xes as shown in Figure 2.6 an be deteted by extending tehniques suh as [36℄ or PR-Miner [58℄ with
the fous on the newly added lok. We an design hekers to detet where the same shared objets are
proteted by lok in some paths while unproteted in some others [36℄, and make these hekers fous only
on heking the pathed ode.
2.6.2 Fixing Deadloks
To x a deadlok, developers may either reverse the order of loks, or even drop some loks. However, these
means need to be applied with aution.
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Figure 2.7: Inorret x to a deadlok introdued a new deadlok. The rst x reversed the order
of loks to prevent deadlok, but forgot to release loks before taking a goto path.
Speially, xing deadloks ould still lead to deadlok bugs. This inorret x pattern is observed in
three of the ode bases we evaluated and in 14.3% (4 out of 28) of the inorret xes to deadloks. Figure 2.7
shows suh an example. The root ause of this inorret x is similar to the one in Figure 2.2. Therefore
we an again extend some urrent path-sensitive bug detetion tools to spot the deadlok.
Additionally, xing deadlok may reveal some other bugs that were originally hidden by the deadlok,
espeially data rae bugs. This inorret x pattern is observed in two of the ode bases we evaluated and in
7.1% (2 out of 28) of the inorret xes to deadloks. Though we only spotted 2 suh ases, we think this is
still an interesting pattern. Figure 2.8 shows one of the examples. There are two bugs in the original ode:
a deadlok aused by the wrong order of the two loks, and a data rae aused by an unproteted shared
variable in the seond for loop. However, the data rae is hidden by the existene of the deadlok sine the
exeution would not even reah the seond for loop due to the deadlok. The rst x exhanged the order
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Figure 2.8: A x to a deadlok exposed a hidden data rae bug.
of two loks (stmf_lok and iss_lokp) and resolved the deadlok. However, it also enables the exeution to
proeed so that the data rae is muh easier to manifest.
Impliations: The hang introdued by deadlok bugs might prevent some exeution paths from being
exerised thoroughly, whih ould make some bugs hidden in those paths diult to manifest. After removing
deadlok bugs, xers should further test those exeution paths.
2.6.3 Fixing Buer Overows
We also found some interesting inorret xes examples for memory bugs. However, sine the total numbers
of inorret xes to buer overows and memory leaks in sample set 2 is not statistially high enough (7
and 8 respetively), we do not laim those examples are frequently observed inorret x patterns. However,
we assume these examples ould be ommon for the inorret xes to buer overows and memory leaks
(shown in Setion 2.6.4) if we an further enlarge our sample set.
Common tehniques to x buer overow inlude: a) restrit the length of the data whih will be stored
into buer by using safe string funtions (e.g., snprintf) or do bound heking; b) inrease the buer size
statially from stak; ) alloate larger buer dynamially from heap to replae a stak buer.
Based on our observation, tehnique a) is usually safe and seldom introdues any further inorret xes
sine it eradiates the hane of a buer overow in the future. Preautions are needed for the use of
bound heking. Bound heking is usually followed by return or goto statements for error handling. These
statements may hange the ontrol ow of the original ode and introdue some other mistakes.
Impliations: The good pratie to x buer overow is to use safe string funtions or do bound heking
when possible.
Tehnique b) is potentially problemati if the developer annot antiipate the input size aurately.
The buer size after inreasing may still be not enough for an untested input in the future. As shown in
Figure 2.9, the rst x was inomplete. After it inreased the size of avail to 20, avail was still overown
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vm_offset_t avail[10]; 
vm_offset_t avail[20];
for (indx = 0; avail[indx + 1] != 0; indx += 2) 
            size1 = avail[indx + 1] - avail[indx];
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vm_offset_t avail[20]; 
vm_offset_t avail[100];
for (indx = 0; avail[indx + 1] != 0; indx += 2) 
            size1 = avail[indx + 1] - avail[indx];
Figure 2.9: Inorret x to a buer overow by inreasing stati buer size. The rst x enlarged
the buer size to 20, but the size was still not big enough. Under ertain input, avail was still overown.
later. Atually even the seond x might still be awed. Sine the developer does not add a bound hek, a
future input beyond the size 100 ould still overow avail.
Impliations: Inreasing the stati buer size an be dangerous if the input size annot be aurately
estimated.
char  tempMail[24];
char  *tempMail;
len = strlen(tmpdir);
tempMail=(char *)malloc(len + ...);
strcpy(tempMail, tmpdir);
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char  *tempMail;
len = strlen(tmpdir);
if ((tempMail = malloc(len + ...)) == NULL)
                   panic("Out of memory");
strcpy(tempMail, tmpdir);
Figure 2.10: Inorret x to a buer overow by alloating heap memory. The rst x alloated
heap memory to replae stak buer, but the return value of mallo was unheked.
For tehnique ), developers need to be aware of the rules to use memory alloation funtions. The
memory alloated needs to be freed after use, otherwise it may introdue a memory leak. Besides, developers
need to onsider handling the ase if memory alloation fails. As shown in Figure 2.10, the xer did x the
buer overow, but introdued a potential invalid memory aess. It replaed the stak buer (tempMail)
with a dynamially alloated buer, but forgot to handle the ase if mallo fails.
Impliations: When alloating memory dynamially to x buer overow, developers also need to follow
the safety rules of using memory alloation funtions.
2.6.4 Fixing Memory Leaks
One a memory leak is deteted, writing xes may be straightforward, but mistakes an still be made.
Speially, xing memory leak an introdue dangling pointer or null pointer dereferene if the pointer
would still be aessed after the free. Figure 2.11 shows an example where a dangling pointer bug was
introdued. After p is freed, it an still be dereferened (after testing against NULL) out of the funtion.
Hene, the seond x further nullies the pointer before the funtion return.
Impliations: It is a good pratie to nullify the pointer after freeing it, whih an avoid dangling pointer
bugs.
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void blk_online_work(online_t *p) { 
    …...     
    kmem_free(p);   
    return;
}
void blk_scan(){
   blk_online_work(info);
   find_blk_by_id(info, WIT_FS)
}
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void blk_online_work(online_t *p) { 
    …...     
    kmem_free(p); 
    p = null  
    return;
}
void blk_scan(){
   blk_online_work(info);
   find_blk_by_id(info, WIT_FS)
}
Figure 2.11: Inorret x to memory leak introdued a dangling pointer. The pointer p was later
used in funtion nd_blk_by_id with null pointer hek. However, the rst x simply freed p without
nullifying it.
…...
acm_free(M_USM,case_username);
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if (IS_DEFAULT(get_choices())) {
     acm_free(M_USM,case_username);
}
Figure 2.12: Inorret x to a memory leak introdued data orruption. The rst x freed the
data indexed by ase_username unonditionally. However, the data should be freed only under ertain
onditions.
Developer may also not be aware of the ondition to free an objet. They should only free an objet
when it is no longer used, not on those paths that it is still in use. If they overreat, they ould mistakenly
free an objet still in use under ertain onditions. Figure 2.12 shows suh an example whih led to data
orruption.
Impliations: Before xing memory leak, developers should make sure when and what should be freed to
avoid overreation.
if (lseek(cat->fd, nextSet, 0) == -1) {
     …...
     free(cat->set);
}
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if (lseek(cat->fd, nextSet, 0) == -1) {
     …...
     if (!cat->set->tag)   free(cat->set->data);
     free(cat->set);    
}
Figure 2.13: Inomplete x to a memory leak. The rst x only freed at->set but forgot to free its
member data.
Besides, xing memory leak an be inomplete. For some omplex data strutures, xers may forget to
free all their members. Figure 2.13 shows suh an example.
Impliations: For omplex data strutures, xers should remember to free all their members.
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2.6.5 Fixing Semanti Bugs
Semanti bugs have very diverse root auses, so the ways to x them are also diversied. However, we still
observed one ommon inorret x pattern for semanti bugs: onditions (e.g., if ondition) are diult to
x orretly. As shown in Figure 2.3, the rst x to the if ondition was still not restritive enough. Though
this pattern is frequently observed, it is not easy to leverage urrent tehniques to detet them. We think
xing semanti bugs orretly may require more appliation spei knowledge from xers.
2.6.6 General Approahes to Detet Inorret Fixes
Understanding the impat of the hange: A fundamental reason for developers to make mistakes
during bug xing is that they do not know all the potential impats of the newly xed ode. For example,
in Figure 2.5, the xer was not aware that the newly added lok s would deadlok with the funtion
bus_teardown_intr. In Figure 2.1, the developer is not aware that buf will need to store an out-of-band
string. If all suh potential inuened ode (either through ontrol- or data-dependeny) is learly presented
to developers, they may have better hanes to detet the errors. More speially, a tool that an show whih
variables are aeted, whih def-use hains are modied, whih paths are deleted, added or altered, and
whih preonditions and postonditions are altered (e.g. a funtion will be alled with a lok held now)
are highly expeted. We envision ompiler tehniques suh as program sliing [102, 42, 107℄ that take the
dependenies to the path as the sliing riterion an be extended to analyze suh information and used to
build suh tools.
Apply hekers inrementally As disussed before, it is possible for some existing bug detetion tools
(hekers) [58, 35, 36℄ to detet some types of inorret xes. However, applying these tools diretly on the
full ode base after the x is not pratial. It may take a very long time for them to san the entire ode
base, whih may be redundant with the original testing steps, or not always neessary. Also it may produe
too many false positives. Instead, developers may want to hek the ode inuened by the path rst. One
observation is that sometimes, just heking within the funtion boundary is enough to detet problems in
the path. For example, as shown in Figure 2.2, a path-sensitive heker that simply heks the rule lok is
always paired with an unlok an easily detet the missed SOCK_UNLOCK by only sanning the funtion
that the path modied. Though sometimes we need inter-proedural analysis to attain more information,
in many ases the urrent detetion tools an be simplied to just hek the hanges in pathes. Then these
tools an be very light-weighted so that developers would be more willing to using them.
Dealing with inomplete xes Some inomplete xes are introdued by the fat that xers may forget
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to x all the buggy regions with the same root ause. This types of inomplete xes an be mitigated
by using tehnique [77, 72℄ whih searhes for other plaes that have the same patterns or usage senarios
in entire ode. For example, in Figure 2.6, the rst x that suggested ertain shared objets need to
be proteted. Then developers an try to nd the other plaes where those objets are aessed without
protetion. However, this tehnique is less eetive when a onsistent pattern is diult to learn. For
instane, those inomplete xes related to onditions (Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2.1) an not be solved by this
tehnique. For these bugs, we think it is better to have more knowledge developers and reviewers in the loop
so that inorret xes ould be avoided. We will disuss this issue in Chapter 2.7.
2.7 Lak of Knowledge
In this setion we study if programmers' ode knowledge is a fator to inorret xes. The orretness of a
x will be inuened by both xer and reviewer. Therefore, we study the knowledge from both the xers
and reviewers' perspetive.
2.7.1 Fixer's Knowledge
Intuitively, if a le is totally written by a developer reently, the developer might have fresh and omplete
knowledge on the le. Then there will be less problem if the developer is the one who xes the bug in this
le. On the ontrary, if a developer knows nothing about a le and he needs to x a problem within this
le, there might be higher probability that he ould introdue an inorret x.
System
Atual Fixer for Atual Fixer for Potential
Inorret Fixes Corret Fixes Optimal Fixer
K_File K_Fun K_File K_Fun K_File K_Fun
A 13.2% (0.022 ) 18.1% (0.046 ) 18.3% (0.019 ) 20.5% (0.012 ) 65.0% (0.043 ) 75.1% (0.031 )
B 9.5% (0.013 ) 11.5% (0.023 ) 15.4% (0.016 ) 27.9% (0.031 ) 39.7% (0.024 ) 51.4% (0.022 )
C 12.8% (0.024 ) 16.1% (0.037 ) 17.2% (0.021 ) 18.4% (0.023 ) 69.8% (0.031 ) 78.1% (0.026 )
D 7.9% (0.017 ) 12.5% (0.035 ) 15.5% (0.024 ) 16.4% (0.021 ) 78.0% (0.023 ) 78.4% (0.039 )
AVG 10.9% 14.6% 16.6% 20.8% 63.1% 70.8%
Table 2.8: The xers' average ode knowledge on the buggy les/funtions. The variane of the
ode knowledge is shown in the parentheses. Code knowledge is shown in the form of perentage (e.g., 13.2%
means a knowledge value of 0.132). Potential optimal xer is the developer with the most knowledge on
the buggy les/funtions but might not be always assigned the bug xing task.
We rst measured the K_File and K_Func (dened in Chapter 2.3.4) for the xers who made the
inorret xes. The results are shown in Table 2.8. We found that in general these xers who made
the inorret xes were not knowledgeable about the buggy les/funtions. Speially, they had only
ontributed on average 10.9% to the les and 14.6% to the funtions involved in the path before they made
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the inorret x. In omparison, Table 2.8 also shows the xers' knowledge in orret xes. Seleting orret
x set is also hallenging, sine to verify the orretness of a x is not trivial. Some x might be orret
now but would be found inorret later. Here we just assume the xes in sample set 1 whih are not lassied
as inorret xes are orret xes. We found those xers who made the orret xes had ontributed on
average 16.6% to the les and 20.8% to the funtions. In other words, the knowledge of the xers who made
the orret xes is 1.5 times of that of the xers who made the inorret x based on our ode knowledge
metris, indiating soure ode knowledge ould be a fator to inorret xes. We observed the knowledge of
the xers who made the orret xes is also not signiantly high. We suspet this is due to that the overall
bug-report assignment proess is not organized enough so that the developer who is the most knowledgeable
about the ode is usually not seleted as a xer.
But an we really nd a developer who is more knowledgeable than the atual xer of the inorret x?
Table 2.8 also answered this question: surprisingly, by seleting the most knowledgeable developer who is
still ative in the development when the bugs need to be xed as the xer, the K_File and K_Func an
reah as high as 63.1% and 70.8% respetively, whih is 5∼6 times of the knowledge of the atual xers in
inorret xes. It should be emphasized that these potential optimal xers are still reahable when the
bugs were opened. We deide this by examining the hek-in history of eah developer. Our result suggests
that the urrent bug xing and reviewing proess is not always assigning the problem to the developers who
ould be most knowledgeable with the bug.
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Figure 2.14: The distribution of inorret xes in dierent knowledge sales.
Figure 2.14 further studies why the K_File and K_Func in inorret xes are low by zooming into
the distribution of inorret xes in dierent knowledge sales. We found the low K_File and K_Func
are aused by a large portion of inorret xes that were made by xers with zero prior knowledge to the
buggy les/funtions. As shown in Figure 2.14, 27.2% of the xers had not ontributed any lines to the
le (K_File = 0%) they were about to x. It is even worse at the funtion level. 51.4% of xers had not
ontributed any lines of ode to the funtion they were about to x. These rst touhes ould be dangerous
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sine the developer ould have little knowledge about the partiular part of ode when they are about to x.
Besides studying the eet of ode knowledge in terms of K_File and K_Func, we further studied the
ode knowledge in terms of whether the xer atually xed the the ode previously written by him. The intu-
ition behind this is that even though a xer had written small amount of ode (i.e., small K_File/K_func),
as long as the xer was modifying the ode regions that he had written, he might be still onsidered as the
knowledgeable person for the x. Speially, for eah x, if any ode line modied by the x was also
previously written by the same xer, we ount this xer is xing his own ode. In other words, we ount
the xer is not xing his own ode only when none of the lines of ode involved in the path was written by
him. The result is shown in Table 2.9.
System For Inorret Fixes For Corret Fixes
A 7.7% 26.2%
B 16.4% 44.8%
C 18.2% 25.9%
D 8.0% 24.1%
AVG 12.6% 30.3%
Table 2.9: The perentage of xes that xer is xing his own ode. For example, the number 7.7% in
the rst ell means: among all the inorret xes from OS A, 7.7% of them were atually xed by developers
who were xing their own ode.
Table 2.9 shows large dierene between orret xes and inorret xes. The ratio of the xers who
xed their own ode for orret xes is 2.5 times of the ratio for inorret xes (30.3% v.s. 12.6%). This
suggests fewer xers (in term of ratio) are xing their own ode for inorret xes than for orret xes,
whih further suggests that xing ode written by others might be prone to inorret xes.
Moreover, knowledge may deay as time goes by. After a developer hasn't been working on a le for quite
long, he may beome unfamiliar with that le even if he had ontributed a lot ode to this le historially.
To measure this perspetive, we further did an experiment whih tried to loate when was the developer's
last modiation on the le before the developer modied a le to x the bug, We alulated the time gap
between two modiation points to analyze the knowledge deay. The results are shown in Table 2.10. For
73.5%∼86.2% of developers, their last modiation on the le before their inorret x is one month ago.
For 32.6%∼58.0% of developers, this gap is even half year ago.
System
More Than More Than More Than More Than
1 Week 1 Month 3 Months Half Year
A 77.2% 73.5% 50.4% 32.6%
B 93.0% 74.8% 62.9% 48.2%
C 85.4% 78.1% 65.7% 58.0%
D 91.7% 87.2% 57.7% 43.3%
Table 2.10: The gap between the last modiation and inorret x.
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Inspired by our study in ode knowledge, a software vendor is building a tool to nd knowledgeable
xers and reviewers. Sometimes when the bug report just arrives it may be unlear whih les/funtions
ontain the bug. In these ases the knowledge is more useful to assign reviewers who are familiar with the
les/funtions involved in the x after the x is made. This knowledge an also be used in prioritizing path
testing eorts to pay more attentions to the pathes xed by less-knowledgeable xers.
Finding: The xers' knowledge on the buggy les/funtions in orret xes is
1.5 times of the xers' knowledge in inorret xes. Fewer xers (in term of ratio)
are xing their own ode for inorret xes than for orret xes. Moreover, nearly
27% of the inorret xes are made by developers who have not ontributed a single
line to the entire le they are about to x. The potential Optimal developer who
is most familiar with the buggy ode has 5∼6 times knowledge of that of the atual
xer in inorret xes.
Impliation: It might be beneial to assign the bugs to developers with more
knowledge during the bug-triage proess. The knowledge an also be onsidered
as a fator in prioritizing the testing eorts on pathes.
2.7.2 Reviewer's Knowledge
One the path is made by the developer, the path usually needs to pass a reviewing proess before releasing
to ustomers. Sine at this time, the information about whih les and funtions are modied is already
available, it is possible for us to selet an optimal set of reviewers who have the best knowledge on that part
of ode. And when those knowledgeable reviewers are on duty, it might be easier for them to detet the
problems hidden in the path. Therefore we also measured K_File and K_Func for the reviewers on both
the inorret xes and orret xes to test our assumption. The results are also shown in Table 2.11.
System
Reviewer for Reviewer for
Optimal Reviewers
Inorret Fixes Corret Fixes
K_File K_Fun K_File K_Fun K_File K_Fun
A 19.7% 18.7% 19.7% 15.6%. 80.0% 89.1%
B 9.0% 11.2% 11.8% 13.5% 49.4% 64.4%
C 13.1% 12.7% 7.6% 13.4% 75.3% 82.9%
D N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
AVG 13.9% 14.2% 12.8% 14.1% 68.2% 78.8%
Table 2.11: The reviewers' average knowledge to the buggy ode. Optimal Reviewers are the top
two developers with the most knowledge to the buggy ode, sine usually there are two reviewers for eah
path. For the ode base D, we annot nd the information about reviewers from its bug database and SCM,
so the entries are marked with N/A.
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Most of the reviewers who reviewed the inorret xes also had little knowledge on the les and funtions
they reviewed. Comparing to the reviewers on orret xes, the knowledge for reviewers on orret xes
is sometimes lower (for A) than the knowledge for reviewers on inorret xes, sometime higher (for B)
and sometimes mixed (for C). The results don't suggest reviewers' knowledge don't have inuene on the
orretness of xes. Still we believe knowledgeable reviewers will be more helpful. We looked into the set
of orret xes. We found for orret xes where xers have low knowledge (less than 10%), the reviewers'
knowledge is usually higher than the reviewers' average knowledge, whih suggests the benets of having
knowledgeable reviewers.
To demonstrate the potential improvement we an ahieve, we also did an enhaned assignment strategy
whih always try to selet the most knowledgeable developers on that part of ode when those people are
available. Our results are still shown in Table 2.11 under the Optimal Reviewer olumns. It shows a 6x-7x
improvement on the knowledge of reviewers. Though future user study need to be onduted to evaluate the
diret impat on the inorret x due to this knowledge improvement on reviewers, we think it is denitely
good to adopt suh hanges.
Finding: The reviewers who review the inorret xes also might not have
enough knowledge on the related ode. However, there were developers with better
knowledge on the ode who were not assigned as reviewers.
Impliation: The reviewing proess ould be potentially improved.
2.7.3 Towards Building a Preditor
In previous setions, we had disovered that the ode knowledge of xers and reviewers ould inuene the
hane of inorret xes. Then it is good to leverage suh information to predit the probability that a x
ould be inorret. Here we want to emphasize that to predit is not to detet. A detetor an usually
pinpoint where the exat error is within a x. A preditor an only tell if a x is likely to be inorret.
Developers need to further look at the x to verify the predition. However, the proess of bug xing an
still benet from a good inorret x preditor. For software vendors, espeially large vendors, there are
always many bugs that they have xed. However, the limited testing resoures prevent them from arefully
examining every bug x. A good preditor an prioritize the ode reviewing to those xes that are more
likely to be buggy.
To build a preditor, we need rst selet the features that ould have relation with inorret xes. It is
hard to have some prior knowledge on whih features are most preditive before running any experiment,
so we rst selet seven features based on our domain knowledge. Another reason we hose these features is
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that they are relatively easy to measure. Some features, though might be related, are hard to measure or
not doumented. Therefore we did not inlude them in our seletion. We do not laim this seletion to be
exhaustive. New features an be further added to rene the preditor.
The features we seleted are:
kfi_t1_f if the xer is the most knowledgeable developer (top1) of the le.
kfi_t3_f if the xer is among the three most knowledgeable developers (top3) of the le.
kfi_t1_r if any reviewer is the most knowledgeable developer (top1) of the le.
kfi_t1_r if any reviewer is among the most knowledgeable developers (top3) of the le.
last_modify how long ago it is the xer's last modiation to the le. If the xer has never touhed the
le before, we used a default maximum value (e.g., 10 years).
num_of_author how many authors have ontributed to the le.
lo the number of ode lines in the le.
Here the rst ve features are all more or less related to the ode knowledge. num_of_author an also
inuene ode knowledge in an impliit way. Sine if there are too many o-authors for a le, eah author
is less likely to be very knowledgeable about the le. lo is a widely used feature among various defet
preditors [91, 52℄. Inluding it may give us a referene on the preditive power of those knowledge related
features.
We used Weka [15℄ to do the feature seletion. We hose information gain as the evaluator and ranker as
the searh sheme. Besides, we also used a ten fold ross validation. Eah x an be represented as a vetor
of these seven features and is labeled as either orret x or inorret x. For onveniene, we ran the
experiment on the data from the ommerial ompany and the results are shown in Table 2.12.
Feature Average Merit
kfi_t1_f 0.213±0.032
kfi_t3_f 0.240±0.025
kfi_t1_r 0.141±0.048
kfi_t3_r 0.157±0.051
last_modify 0.125±0.039
num_of_author 0.263±0.034
loc 0.128±0.041
Table 2.12: The average merit for the eight features when they are used to predit whether a
x is orret or not. Here for onveniene, we just used the data from the ommerial ompany.
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As shown in the Table 2.12, num_of_author atually has the highest preditive power, followed losely
by kfi_t3_f . It may be a little bit surprising that num_of_author ranks suh top. We guess this suggested
that it might not be good to have too many authors for a le. If that happens, it not only inreases the
omplexity of management and ommuniation, but also suppresses the average ode knowledge. kfi_t3_f
is more preditive than kfi_t1_f . This suggests that it will be too restritive if we only look at if a xer is
the top1 knowledgeable developer. In order to ahieve a good disrimination, we should relax the onstraint
a little. We also found generally the ode knowledge of xers are more important than that of reviewers. We
think that this is beause xer is the diret fator that deides the orretness of a x. Besides, reviewers
may not spend all their eorts in reviewing the x and some error in the x might be hard to detet.
This suggests that it might be more beneial to nd a knowledgeable xer. lo and last_modify are the
two least preditive ones. Atually lo is frequently used in a lot of defet preditors, but our experiment
suggested that it might not be a good feature to predit inorret x.
Our experiment only shows the prospet of building a preditor for inorret xes inluding the features
that relate to ode knowledge. To build a more solid and reliable preditor will remain as our future work.
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Chapter 3
The Charateristi Study on
Misongurations
3.1 Overview
To study misongurations, rst we need to fully understand what a misonguration is. Most previous work
has just foused on errors in onguration parameters (i.e., entries in onguration les). Do misongu-
rations only refer to onguration parameters? Aording to Federal Standard 1037C [16℄, onguration
is dened as: In ommuniations or omputer system, an arrangement of funtional units aording to
their nature, number, and hief harateristis. Conguration pertains to hardware, software, rmware,
and doumentation. Therefore, besides onguration parameter errors, misongurations also inlude other
types.
In our study, we not only studied onguration parameters, but also looked into other types of ongu-
rations, suh as how a system is organized and whether dierent modules are ompatible with eah other.
Besides, we also briey studied the miongurations that happen at hardware layer.
There are many attributes (questions) related to a onguration problem. We should hoose those that
an give us enough insights on solving the problem of misongurations, or even avoid the ourrene of
misongurations fundamentally.
We think it would be useful to know the ommon root auses, mistake patterns, and impats of mison-
gurations. For example, how are misongurations introdued? What fration of them are introdued due
to software upgrades? For parameter-based misongurations, how many parameters are usually involved?
What perentages of misongurations involve multiple mahines or omponents? What perentages of
misongurations violate the syntax or format requirements of onguration les, and what perentage of
misongurations have perfetly legal parameter values and are simply not delivering the funtionality in-
tended by users? What kind of ongurations are error-prone? What are the impats of misongurations?
Do they make systems fully or partially unavailable? The answers to the above questions are useful for
building more eetive tools to detet, diagnose or x misongurations automatially.
Moreover, it would also be helpful to know how today's systems reat to misongurations. Do they
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Findings on High Level Questions (Chapter 3.4)
Are onguration
issues prevalent?
Similar to the results from previous studies [43, 79, 75℄, our study using data from a
ommerial vendor also shows a signiant portion (27%) of ustomer ases are related to
onguration issues.
Are onguration
issues severe?
Conguration issues are not of low severity as is ommonly thought. In fat, their perent-
age is inreased to 31% if we onsider only high severity problems reported by ustomers.
Findings on Misonguration Types (Chapter 3.5)
What types of
misongurations
are there?
Conguration parameter mistakes aount for the majority (70.0%∼85.5%) of the exam-
ined misongurations.
However, a signiant portion (14.5%∼30.0%) of the examined misongurations are
aused by software ompatibility and omponent onguration, whih are not well ad-
dressed so far.
What types of pa-
rameter mistakes
are there?
38.1%∼53.7% of parameter misongurations are aused by illegal parameters that learly
violate some format or semanti rules dened by the system, and an be potentially de-
teted by hekers that inspet against these rules.
However, a large portion (46.3%∼61.9%) of the examined parameter misongurations
have legal parameters but do not deliver the funtionality intended by users. These ases
are more diult to detet by automati hekers and may require more user training or
better onguration design.
Any speial pat-
tern?
A signiant portion (12.2%∼29.7%) of parameter mistakes are due to value-based inon-
sisteny, alling for an inonsisteny heker or a better onguration design that does not
require users to worry about suh error-prone onsisteny onstraints.
Is a misongura-
tion always within
the appliation of
interest?
Although most misongurations are loated within eah examined appliation, a signi-
ant portion (21.7%∼57.3%) involve ongurations beyond the appliation itself or span
over multiple hosts.
System Reation to Misongurations (Chapter 3.6)
Do systems detet
the misong?
Only 7.2%∼15.5% of the studied misonguration problems provide expliit messages pin-
point the loation of the error.
Mysterious rea-
tion?
Misonguration ases an make systems to misbehave suh as rash, hanging or severe
performane degradation, making failure diagnosis a hallenging task.
Possible to have
better msgs?
Among the 208 ases with illegal parameters, fewer than 20% of them provide expliit
messages. Up to 31.3% of them did not provide any message at all.
Benet of expliit
msgs.
Expliit messages that pinpoint onguration errors an shorten the diagnosis time as
muh as 14.5 times omparing to the ases with in-expliit messages or no messages at all.
Findings on Causes of Misongurations (Chapter 3.7)
Did the system
use to work?
For simpler systems, the majority of misongurations are related to rst-time use of
ertain desired funtionality. For more omplex and larger systems, a signiant perentage
(16.7%∼32.4%) of the misongurations were introdued into systems that used to work
ne.
Why did it work
before, but now
doesn't?
By looking into the 100 used-to-work ases (32.4% of the total) at COMP-A, 46% of them
are attributed to onguration parameter hanges due to routine maintenane, onguring
for new funtionality, system outages, et, and an benet from traking onguration
hanges. The remainder are aused by non-parameter related issues suh as hardware
hanges (18%), external environmental hanges (8%), resoure exhaustion (14%), and
software upgrades(14%).
Findings on Impat of Misongurations (Chapter 3.8)
How muh impat
do misongura-
tions have?
Although most studied misonguration ases only lead to partial unavailability of the
system, 16.1%∼47.3% of them make the systems to be fully unavailable or ause severe
performane degradation.
Table 3.1: Our major ndings of real world misonguration harateristis. Please take our
methodology and potential threats to validity into onsideration when you interpret and draw any onlu-
sions.
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detet misongurations and have expliit messages pointing out the onguration problem, or are they
not well prepared for misongurations, or even worse, do they result in rashes, hangs or other types
of failures that are very hard to diagnose and dierentiate from other root auses (e.g., software bugs or
hardware errors)? Some analysis of existing systems would help guide developers in implementing systems
that are better prepared for misongurations and redue the amount of time spent by support engineers in
troubleshooting failures aused by onguration errors.
Finally, a misonguration harateristi study an also help developers design better onguration logi
that is less prone to onguration errors. Misongurations are dierent from software bugs. The latter are
introdued solely by developers; the former lie in a gray zone between developers and users beause either
party ould be responsible for a misonguration. This undened responsibility may onfuse developers
when they are designing the onguration logi, onstraints and requirements of a system. Therefore,
some vulnerabilities an be introdued into the onguration requirements whih make users prone to
onguration mistakes. Understanding the major types and root auses of misongurations may help guide
developers to better design onguration logi and requirements, and redue the likelihood of onguration
mistakes by users.
All the above motivations are alling for a omprehensive harateristi study on real world misongu-
rations. Unfortunately, in omparison to software bugs that have well-maintained bug databases and have
beneted from many software bug harateristi studies [94, 95, 33, 60℄, a misonguration harateristi
study is muh harder, mainly beause historial misongurations usually have not been reorded rigorously
in databases.
In this thesis, we sampled over 3,000 ustom reported ases from both ommerial system (COMP-A's
system and open soure systems (CentOS, MySQL, Apahe and OpenLDAP). From the over 3,000 sampled
ases, we manually identied 546 misonguration ases and studied their harateristis based on the
questions we raised previously. Among these 546 ases, 309 ases are from the ommerial system and the
other 237 ases are from the four open soure systems. Our major ndings are listed in Table 3.1.
While we believe that the misonguration ases we examined well represent the harateristis in large
system software, we do not intend to draw any general onlusions about all the appliations. In partiular,
we should note that all of the harateristis and ndings in this study are assoiated with the types of the
systems. Therefore, our results should be taken with the spei system types and our methodology in mind
(disussed in Chapter 3.3).
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3.2 Bakground
Charateristi studies on operator errors: Several previous works have examined the ontribution
of operation errors or administrator mistakes [43, 69, 79, 75, 71, 73℄. For example, Jim Gray found 42%
of system failures are due to administration errors [43℄. Patterson et al. [79℄ also observed a similar trend
in telephone networks. Murphy et al. [69℄ found the perentage of failures due to system management is
inreasing over time. Oppenheimer et al. [75℄ studied the failures of the Internet servies and found that
onguration errors are the largest ategory of operator errors. Nagaraja et al. [71℄ also had similar ndings
from a user study.
To the best of our knowledge, very few studies have dived deeper into misongurations and examined
the subtypes, root auses, impats and system reations to misongurations, espeially in both ommerial
and open soure systems with a large set of real world misongurations.
Detetion of misongurations: A series of work [99, 101, 38, 17℄ in reent years tried to detet
misongurations. The tehniques used in Peerpressure [99℄ and its predeessor Strider [101℄ have been
disussed in Chapter 1.2. RCC [38℄ heks the router onguration against an abstrat model of BGP
protool to detet the misonguration mistakes. Mirosoft Baseline Seurity Analyzer (MBSA) [17℄ detets
ommon seurity-related misongurations by heking onguration les against predened rules.
Diagnosis of misongurations: Besides detetion, another series of work [103, 92, 24, 25℄ tried to
diagnose problems after the errors happen. We have already disussed AutoBash [92℄, ConfAid [25℄, and
Chronus [103℄ in Chapter 1.2. The appliability of Chronus depends on how many misongurations belong
to the used-to-work ategory. A follow-up work to AutoBash by Attariyan et al. [24℄ leverages system
all information to trak the ausality relation, whih overomes the limitations of the Hamming distane
omparison used in AutoBash to further enhane auray. Similar to [24℄, Yuan et al. [106℄ uses mahine
learning tehniques to orrelate system all information to problem auses in order to diagnose onguration
errors. Most of these works foused on parameter-related misongurations.
Tolerane of misongurations: Some researh work [92, 30℄ an help x or tolerate misongurations.
In addition to AutoBash [92℄ (as disussed in Chapter 1.2), Undo [30℄ uses hekpoints to allow administrators
to have a hane to roll bak if they made some misongurations. Obviously it assumes that the system
used to work ne, whih is true for some ases but not all as our results have shown.
Avoidane of misonguration: One approah to avoid misonguration is to develop tools to ong-
ure the system automatially. SmartFrog [19℄ uses a delarative language to desribe software omponents,
onguration parameters and how they should onnet to eah other. Congurations an then be automat-
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ially generated to greatly mitigate human errors. Similarly, Zheng et al. [110℄ leverage ustom speied
templates to automatially generate the orret onguration for a system. Kardo [54℄ adopts mahine
learning tehniques to automatially extrat the solution operations out of user's UI sequene and apply
them automatially. These solutions then an be used to help users to ongure their system automatially.
A more fundamental approah is to design better onguration logi/interfae to avoid misongurations
at the rst plae. Maxion et al. [62℄ disovered that many misongurations for NTFS permission are due to
that the onguration interfaes do not provide adequate information to users. Therefore, they proposed a
new design of interfae with subgoal support whih an eetively redue the onguration errors on NTFS
permission by 94%.
Misonguration injetion: As mentioned in Chapter 1.2, a misonguration injetion framework like
Conferr [50℄ is very useful in evaluating tehniques for deteting, diagnosing and xing misongurations.
Our study an be beneial for suh framework to onstrut a more aurate misonguration model.
Online validation: Another avenue of work [71, 73, 74, 34℄ tried to validate the system to detet operator
mistakes. Nagaraja et al. [71℄ developed a validation framework whih an detet operator mistakes before
deployment by omparing against the omparator funtions provided by users. A follow-up work by Oliveira
et al. [73℄ tried to validate database system administrations. Another follow-up work by Oliveira et al. [74℄
tried to address the limitation of previous validation system whih does not protet against human errors
diretly performed on the prodution system. Mirage [34℄ also has a sub-system for validating the upgrading
of the system.
Mis.: Wang et al. [100℄ used reverse engineering to extrat the seurity related onguration parameter
automatially. People an use this to slie the onguration le and to see if the seurity related param-
eters are orret. Ramahandran et al. [85℄ tried to extrat the orrelations between parameters, whih
an be used to detet some of the inonsisteny misongurations in our study. Rabkin et al. [83℄ found
that the onguration spae after anonialization is not very big after having analyzed seven open-soure
appliations. Therefore a thorough test of dierent onguration parameters might be possible for ertain
appliations if input is generated in a smart way.
As we disussed in Chapter 1.2, our harateristi study of real world misongurations would be useful
to provide some guidelines to evaluate, improve and extend some of the above work on deteting, diagnosing,
and xing misongurations, as well as misonguration injetion.
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3.3 Methodology
There are unique hallenges in obtaining and analyzing a large set of real-world misongurations. Histori-
ally, unlike bugs that usually have Bugzillas as repositories, misongurations are not reorded rigorously.
Muh of the information is in the form of unstrutured textual desriptions and there is no systemati way to
report misonguration ases. Therefore, As one of the rst attempts to study misonguration harater-
istis, our study is a best-eort one. In order to overome these hallenges, we manually analyzed reported
misonguration ases by studying manuals, instrutions, soure ode, and knowledge bases of eah system.
For some hard ases, we ontated the orresponding engineers through emails or phone alls to understand
them thoroughly. The overall eort took about 21 man-months, exluding the help from several COMP-A
engineers and open soure developers.
3.3.1 Data Sets
We examined misonguration data for one ommerial system and four open-soure systems. The ommer-
ial system is the storage system from COMP-A, one of the primary storage vendors in the world. The ore
software running in suh system is proprietary to COMP-A, inluding its operating system that manages the
storage system. The open soure systems inlude CentOS, MySQL, Apahe HTTP server, and OpenLDAP.
We foused primarily on software misongurations. We will only briey talk about hardware misongu-
rations in Chapter 3.5.7, sine there is no suient data for hardware misongurations on systems running
the open-soure software.
COMP-A storage systems onsist of multiple omponents inluding storage ontrollers, disk shelves,
and interonnetions between them (e.g., swithes). These systems an be ongured in a variety of ways
for ustomers with dierent degrees of expertise. For instane, COMP-A oers tools that greatly simplify
system onguration (e.g., Provisioning Manager [81℄, Protetion Manager [9℄, et.) and tools that perform
automati onguration analysis to detet misongurations and identify potential ompatibility issues for
software upgrades [97℄. We annot asertain from the data whether users ongured the systems diretly or
used tools for onguration.
The misonguration ases we studied are from COMP-A's oial ustomer-issues database, whih
reords problems reported by ustomers. For auray, we onsidered only losed ases, i.e. ases that
COMP-A has provided a solution to the users. Also, to be as relevant as possible, we foused on only ases
over the last two years. COMP-A's support proess is rigorous, espeially in omparison to open-soure
projets. For example, when a ustomer ase is losed, the support engineer needs to reord information
about the root ause as well as resolution. Suh information is very valuable for our study. There are many
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ases labeled as Conguration-related by support engineers and it is prohibitively diult to study all of
them. Therefore, we randomly sampled 1,000 ases labeled as related to onguration. Not all 1,000 ases
are misongurations beause more than half of them are simply ustomer questions related to how the
system should be ongured. Hene we did not onsider them as misongurations. We also pruned out
a few ases for whih we annot determine whether a onguration error ourred. After areful manual
examination, we identied 309 ases as misongurations, as shown in Table 3.2.
Besides COMP-A storage systems, we also studied four open-soure systems: CentOS, MySQL, Apahe
HTTP server, and OpenLDAP. All are mature software systems, well-maintained and widely used. CentOS
is an enterprise-lass Linux distribution, ommonly used by organizations and individuals. We hose CentOS
beause it is a full-edged operating system with various appliations and servies built on top. CentOS
inludes a multi-layer software stak, from the operating system to servies and appliations running on
it. We also seleted three other open soure systems to represent widely used Internet servies, inluding a
database server (MySQL), a web server (Apahe HTTP server) and a diretory server (OpenLDAP).
For open soure software, the misonguration ases ome from three soures: oial user-support
forums, mailing lists, and ServerFault.om (a large question-answering website fousing on system admin-
istration). Whenever neessary, sripts were used to identify ases related to systems of interest, as well
as to remove those that were not onrmed by users. We then randomly sampled from all the remaining
andidate ases (the andidate set sizes and the sample set sizes are also shown in Table 3.2) and manually
examined eah ase to hek if it is a misonguration. Our manual examination yielded a total of 237
misonguration ases from these four open-soure systems. The yield ratio (used ases/sampled ases) is
low for these open-soure projets beause we observe a higher ratio of ases that are ustomer questions
among the samples from open soure projets as ompared to the ommerial data
System Total Cases Sampled Cases Used Cases
COMP-A ondential 1000 309
CentOS 4338 521 60
MySQL 3340 720 55
Apahe 8513 616 60
OpenLDAP 1447 472 62
Total N/A 3329 546
Table 3.2: The systems we studied and the number of misonguration ases we identied for
eah of them.
3.3.2 Threats to Validity and Limitations
Many harateristi studies suer from limitations suh as the systems or workloads not being representative
of the entire population, the semantis of events suh as failures diering aross dierent systems, and so
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on. Given that misonguration ases have onsiderably less information than ideal to work with, and that
we need to perform all of the analysis manually, our study has a few more limitations. We believe that these
limitations do not invalidate our results; at the same time, we urge the reader to fous on overall trends
and not on preise numbers. We expet that most systems and proesses for onguration errors would
have similar limitations to the ones we fae. Therefore, we hope that the limitations of our methodology
would inspire tehniques and proesses that an be used to reord misongurations more rigorously and in
a format amenable to automated analysis.
Representativeness of system: We seleted these software systems for two reasons: (1) they are mature
and widely used, and (2) they have a large set of misonguration ases reported by users. While we
annot draw onlusions about any general system, our examined systems are representative of typial large,
server-based systems.
Sampling: To make the time and eort manageable, we sampled the data sets. As shown on Table 3.2,
our sample rates are statistially signiant and our olletions are also large enough to be statistially
meaningful [40℄. In our result tables, we also show the statistial errors with a 95% ondene level based
on our sampling rates. we fous on software misongurations, and only briey look into hardware mis-
ongurations sine we do not have suient data on suh ases from the open soure systems that we
examined.
Users: The soures from whih we sample ontain only user-reported ases. Users may hoose not to
report trivial misongurations. Also, it is more likely that novie users may report more misonguration
problems. We do not have suient data to judge whether a user is new or an expert. But with new systems
or major revisions of an existing system deployed to the eld, there will always be new users. Thus in that
sense our ndings are still valid.
User environment: Some misongurations may have been prevented, or deteted and resolved automat-
ially by the system or other tools. This senario is partiularly true for COMP-A systems. At the same
time, some, but not all, COMP-A ustomers use the tools provided by COMP-A and we annot distinguish
the two in the data.
System versions: We also observe that software is onstantly evolving. We do not dierentiate between
system versions. It is possible that some of the reported onguration issues have already been or are being
addressed during system evolution (e.g., automatially orreting it, providing better error messages, et.).
Therefore some of the reported onguration issues may not apply to some versions. However, sine we
studied the ases in the last 2 years, suh ases should be rare in our data sets.
Overall, our study is representative of user-reported misongurations whih are more hallenging, urgent,
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or important.
3.4 High Level Questions
Before diving into misongurations, we rst look at how prevalent they are in the eld and how severely
they impat ustomers. For this, we analyzed all the ustomer reported ases over the last two years from
COMP-A. There are ve root auses lassied by COMP-A engineers after resolving eah ustomer reported
problem: onguration (onguration related), hardware failure, bug, ustomer environment and user
knowledge. The rst three types of root auses are easy to understand with their literal meaning. For the
latter two, ustomer Environment majorly refers to the ases aused by power supplies, ooling systems
or other environmental issues, while user knowledge primarily onsists of the ases where ustomers just
ask various tehnial questions without mentioning a partiular failure. Eah ase is also labeled with a
severity level by ustomer support engineers, ranged from 1 to 4, based on how severe the problem is in
the eld. Cases with severity level of 1 or 2 are usually onsidered as high severity ases that require
prompt responses.
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Figure 3.1: Root ause distribution among the ustomer problems reported to COMP-A.
Figure 3.1(a) shows the distribution of ustomer ases based on dierent root auses. Figure 3.1(b) further
shows the distribution of high severity ases. We do not have the results for the open soure systems due to
unavailability of suh labeled data (i.e., ustomer issues aused by hardware, software bugs, ongurations,
et.).
Among all ve ategories, onguration related issues ontribute to 27% of the ustomer reported ases
and are the seond most pervasive root ause of ustomer problems. Although hardware failures aused more
ustomer reported problems, they have lower average priority than the problems aused by misonguration.
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Furthermore, onsidering only high severity ases, onguration related issues beome the most signiant
ontributor. They ontribute to 31% of high severity ases, whih is ahead of 25% by ustomer environment,
20% by hardware failure and 15% by bugs. So we summarize the results into the following ndings:
Finding: Similar to the results from previous studies [43, 79, 75℄, our study using
data from a ommerial vendor also shows a signiant portion (27%) of ustomer
ases are related to onguration issues.
Finding: Conguration issues are not of low severity as is ommonly thought.
In fat, their perentage is inreased to 31% if we onsider only high severity
problems reported by ustomers.
3.5 Misonguration Types
3.5.1 Distribution among Dierent Types
To zoom into misongurations, we rst looked at what types of misongurations are in the real world and
their distributions. We lassied the examined misonguration ases into three ategories:
Parameter onguration parameter mistakes. A parameter ould be either an entry in a onguration le
or a onsole ommand for onguring ertain funtionality.
Compatibility misongurations related to software ompatibility (i.e. whether dierent omponents or
modules are ompatible with eah other).
Component other remaining software misongurations (e.g., a module is missing).
System Parameter Compatibility Component Total
COMP-A 246 (79.6±2.4%) 31 (10.0±1.8%) 32 (10.4±1.8%) 309
CentOS 42 (70.0±3.7%) 11 (18.3±3.1%) 7 (11.7±2.6%) 60
MySQL 47 (85.5±2.3%) 0 8 (14.5±2.3%) 55
Apahe 50 (83.4±2.8%) 5 (8.3±2.1%) 5 (8.3±2.1%) 60
OpenLDAP 49 (79.0±3.0%) 7 (11.2±2.3%) 6 (9.7±2.2%) 62
Table 3.3: The numbers of misongurations of eah type. Their perentages and the sampling errors
are also shown.
Table 3.3 shows the following two ndings:
43
Finding: Conguration parameter mistakes aount for the majority
(70.0%∼85.5%) of the examined misongurations.
Finding: However, a signiant portion (14.5%∼30.0%) of the examined mis-
ongurations are aused by software ompatibility and omponent onguration,
whih are not well addressed so far.
First, our ndings support reent researh eorts suh as [99, 103, 92, 25℄ on deteting, diagnosing or
xing parameter-based misongurations. Seond, the ndings should send a signal to system designers
to have fewer knobs (i.e. parameters) or fewer ompliated knobs for users to ongure and tune their
system.. Whenever possible, auto-onguration [110℄ should be preferred beause in many ases users may
not be as sophistiated and experiened as the developers may expet.
Our ndings also all for attention to investigating solutions dealing with non-parameter-based ongu-
rations suh as software inompatibility, et. For example, system designers or release engineers may need to
think about shipping a omplete pakage, or even using an appliane (whether virtual or physial) deploy-
ment model or a software-as-a-servie (SaaS) model to redue these inompatibility and general onguration
issues.
3.5.2 Parameter Misongurations
In this setion, we study the types of parameter mistakes (as shown in Table 3.4) and the number of
parameters needed to be onsidered to diagnose or to x a parameter misonguration.
Types of mistakes in parameter onguration First, we look at parameter mistakes that learly
violate some impliit or expliit onguration rules related to format, syntax or semantis. We all them
illegal  misongurations beause they are unaeptable to the examined system. Figure 3.2(a)∼(g) show
seven suh examples. These types of misongurations may be deteted automatially by heking against
onguration rules.
System Legal
Illegal
Format Value
Lexial Syntax
Typo
Value Inonsist Value Inonsist
Others
Mistakes Mistakes with Values with Env
COMP-A 114(46.3±6.1%) 10(4.1±2.4%) 5(2.0±1.7%) 3(1.2±1.3%) 73 (29.7±5.6%) 32(13.0±4.1%) 9(3.7±2.3%)
CentOS 26 (61.9±13.8%) 1(2.4±4.4%) 0 2(4.8±6.0%) 6 (14.3±10.0%) 6(14.3±10.0%) 1(2.4±6.0%)
MySQL 24(51.1±12.7%) 1(2.1±3.6%) 0 0 7(14.9%±9.0%) 8(17.0%±9.5%) 7(14.9±9.0%)
Apahe 27(54.0±13.3%) 3(6.0±6.3%) 3(6.0±6.3%) 1(2.0±3.7%) 7(14.0±9.3%) 5(10.0±8.0%) 4(8.0±7.3%)
OpenLDAP 23(46.9±11.5%) 7(14.3±8.0%) 11(22.4±9.6%) 0 6(12.2±7.5%) 1(2.0±3.2%) 1(2.0±3.2%)
Table 3.4: The distribution of dierent types of parameter mistakes for eah appliation.
In ontrast, some other parameter mistakes are perfetly  legal , but they are inorret simply beause
they do not deliver the funtionality or performane desired by users, like the examples in Figure 3.2(h)
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InitiatorName: iqn:DEV_domain
(a) Illegal 1 – Format – Lexical                       from COMP-A
Description: for COMP-A's iscsi device, the name 
of initiator (InitiatorName) can only allow 
lowercase letters, while the user set the name with 
some capital letters "DEV".
 AutoCommit = True
(h) Legal 1                                                         from MySQL
Description: the parameter AutoCommit controls if 
updates are written to disk automatically after every 
insert. Either "True" or "False" is a legal value. 
However, the user was experiencing an "insert" 
intensive workload, so setting the value as "True" will 
hurt performance dramatically. 
Impact: the performance of MySQL is very bad.
Impact: a storage share cannot be recognized.
extension = mysql.so
 …...
extension = recode.so
(c) Illegal 3 – Format – Syntax           from Apache with PHP 
Description: When using PHP in Apache, the 
extension "mysql.so" depends on "recode.so". 
Therefore the order between them matters. The 
user configured the order in a wrong way.
Impact: Apache cannot start due to seg fault.
"recode.so" must 
be put before 
"mysql.so"
(f) Illegal 6 – Value – Env Inconsistency          from MySQL
datadir = /some/old/path 
Description: the parameter "datadir" specifies the 
directory that stores the data files. After the data files 
were moved to other directory during migration, the 
user did not update datadir to the new directory.
    The path does not contain data files any more
(g) Illegal 7 – Value – Env Inconsistency        from COMP-A
192.168.x.x  system-e0 
Description: In the hosts file of COMP-A's system, 
The mapping from ip address to interface name needs 
to be specified. However, the user mapped the ip  
"192.168.x.x" to a non-existed interface "system-e0". 
There is no interface
named "system-e0"
Impact: MySQL cannot start.
Impact: The host cannot be accessed.
olcPPolicyDefault:  "cn=df,ou=pl,dc=ex,dc=com"
(b) Illegal 2 – Format – Lexical                   from OpenLDAP
Description: in OpenLDAP, the value of 
olcPPolicyDefault should be not enclosed with 
quotes,  while the user had two quotes there.
Impact: ppolicy module cannot work normally.
This entry is missing
(d) Illegal 4 – Format – Syntax                    from OpenLDAP
include schema/ppolicy.schema
overlay ppolicy
Description: to use the password policy (i.e. ppolicy) 
overlay, user needs to first include the related 
schema in the configuration file. But the user did not 
do that. 
Impact: the LDAP server fails to work.
This entry is missing
(e) Illegal 5 – Format – Syntax                         from Apache
NameVirtualHost abc.com
<VirtualHost abc.com>
…...
Description: to use VirtualHost in Apache, user 
needs to first define a virtual host by using 
NameVirtualHost. But the user did not do that. 
Impact: virtual host fails to work in Apache.
 CPU Fan Speed = 1500 rpm
(i) Legal 2                                                        from CentOS
Description: the parameter CPU Fan Speed controls 
the cooling of CPU by setting a fan speed. Any speed 
number is a valid value. However, the user was 
running a CPU intensive workload. Setting the speed 
as 1500 rpm is not enough to cool down CPU..  
Impact: system generates warning messages for an 
overheated CPU.
Figure 3.2: Examples of dierent types of onguration parameter related mistakes. (legal vs.
illegal, lexial error, syntax error and some inonsisteny error.) The examples of the type value
inonsisteny will be shown in Chapter 3.5.3.
and (i). These kinds of mistakes are diult to detet unless users' expetation and intent an be speied
separately and heked against onguration settings. We think more user training may redue these kinds
of mistakes, as an simplied system onguration logi, espeially for things that an be automatially
ongured by systems themselves.
Finding: 38.1%∼53.7% of parameter misongurations are aused by illegal pa-
rameters that learly violate some format or semanti rules dened by the system,
and an be potentially deteted by hekers that inspet against these rules.
Finding: However, a large portion (46.3% ∼61.9%) of the parameter mison-
gurations have perfetly legal parameters but do not deliver the funtionality
intended by users. These ases are more diult to detet by automati hekers
and may require more user training or better onguration design.
To further look into illegal misongurations, we sub-ategorize them into illegal format, in whih some
parameters do not obey format rules suh as lower ase, eld separators, et.; and illegal value, in whih
the parameter format is orret but the value violates some onstraints, e.g., the value of a parameter should
be smaller than some threshold.
Illegal format misongurations inlude both  lexial  and syntax  mistakes. Similar to lexial and
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syntax errors in program languages, a lexial mistake violates the grammar of a single parameter, like the
examples shown in Figure 3.2(a) and (b); a syntax mistake violates strutural onstraints of the format, like
the examples shown on Figure 3.2(), (d) and (e). As shown in Table 3.4, up to 14.3% of the parameter
misongurations are lexial mistakes, and up to 22.4% are syntax mistakes.
Illegal value misongurations mainly onsist of value inonsisteny and environment inonsisteny
mistakes. Value inonsisteny means that some parameter settings violate some relationship onstraints with
some other parameters, while environment inonsisteny means that some parameter's setting is inonsis-
tent with the system environment (i.e., physial onguration). Figure 3.2(f) and (g) give two environment
inonsisteny example. As shown in Table 3.4, value inonsisteny aounts for 12.2%∼29.7% of the param-
eter misongurations, while environment inonsisteny ontributes 2.0%∼17.0%. Both an be deteted by
some well designed hekers as long as the onstraints are known and enforeable. We will further disuss
this type of parameter mistakes in details in Chapter 3.5.3.
Finding: A signiant portion (12.2%∼29.7%) of parameter mistakes are due
to value-based inonsisteny, alling for an inonsisteny heker or a better on-
guration design that does not require users to worry about suh error-prone
onsisteny onstraints.
As some previous work on deteting or diagnosing misonguration fouses on only single onguration
parameter mistakes, we looked into what perentages of parameter mistakes involve only a single parameter.
Table 3.5 shows the number
1
of parameters involved in the mistakes, as well as the number of parameters
whih were hanged to x the misonguration. The results indiate that there are about 23.4%∼61.2%
of the parameter mistakes involve multiple parameters. Some of these ases are due to parameter value
inonsisteny.
In omparison, about 14.9%∼34.7% of the examined misongurations require xing multiple parameters.
For example, sometimes the performane of a system ould be inuened by several parameters. To gain a
satisfying amount of performane, all these parameters need to be onsidered and set orretly.
The results above an give researhers and engineers some rough ideas about what perentage of mis-
ongurations some partiular tehnique (proposed either previously or in the future) are appliable.
1
Please note these numbers may not be the same beause a mistake may involve two parameters, but an be xed by
hanging only one parameter.
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System
Number of Involved Parameters
One Multiple Unknown
COMP-A 117(47.6%±6.1%) 117(47.6%±6.1%) 12(4.8%±2.6%)
CentOS 30(71.4%±12.8%) 10(23.8%±12.1%) 2(4.8%±6.0%)
MySQL 35(74.5%±11.0%) 11(23.4%±10.7%) 1(2.1%±3.6%)
Apahe 31(62.0%±13.0%) 16(32.0%±12.4%) 3(6.0%±6.3%)
OpenLDAP 18(36.7%±11.1%) 30(61.2%±11.2%) 1(2.0%±3.2%)
System
Number of Fixed Parameters
One Multiple Unknown
COMP-A 189(76.8%±5.1%) 44(17.9%±4.7%) 13(5.3%±2.7%)
CentOS 33(78.6%±11.7%) 7(16.7%±10.6%) 2(4.8%±6.1%)
MySQL 39(83.0%±9.5%) 7(14.9%±9.0%) 1(2.1%±3.6%)
Apahe 33(66.0%±12.7%) 14(28.0%±12.0%) 3(6.0%±6.3%)
OpenLDAP 29(59.2%±11.3%) 17(34.7%±11.0%) 3(6.1%±5.5%)
Table 3.5: The number of parameters in the onguration parameter mistakes.
Finding: The majority (36.7%∼74.5%) of parameter mistakes an be diagnosed
by onsidering only one parameter, and an even higher perentage(59.2%∼83.0%)
of them an be xed by hanging the value of only one parameter.
Finding: However, a signiant portion (23.4%∼61.2%) of parameter mistakes
involve more than one parameter, and 14.9%∼34.7% require xing more than one
parameter.
The problem domains that eah parameter mistake belongs to is also an interesting question sine it
an warn the developers when they are designing or implementing the onguration logi of ertain fun-
tional module in the system. We deide the domain based on the funtionality of the involved parameter.
Four major problem domains are observed: network, permission/privilege, performane, and devies.
Overall, 18.3% of examined parameter mistakes relate to how the network is ongured; 16.8% relate to
permission/privilege; 7.1% relate to performane adjustment. For the COMP-A systems and CentOs (the
OSes), 8.5%∼26.2% of examined parameter mistakes are about devie ongurations. There are no devie
onguration issues in other systems that we studied, sine these systems are running on a higher level.
3.5.3 Value Inonsisteny
As disussed in Chapter 3.5.2, a sizable amount of parameter mistakes are due to the fat that ertain
onstraints/rules among onguration parameters are violated. We all this type of parameter mistakes
value inonsisteny. Aording to Table 3.4, 4.7%∼29.6% of parameter mistakes are due to this type of
problem. We fous on this type of misonguration is this setion. Besides, we also disuss the reasons that
lead to these errors as well as the potential solutions.
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Users edit onguration parameters in order to fulll a partiular goal. For example, the goal ould be to
turn on a ertain feature (e.g. virus hek), to let the system run in a partiular mode (e.g., multithreaded
mode) or something else. Sometime this is of low omplexity, sine there may be only one onguration
parameter whih relates to the goal that users want to ahieve (as shown in Table 3.5). Therefore, users
only need to be aware of that parameter to get their business done. However, there are a substantial large
number of ases where more than one parameters need to be onsidered in order to meet users' goal (also
as shown in Table 3.5), whih makes the tasks of onguration omplex and error prone.
Figure 3.3 gives the examples of two onguration senarios that we disussed above. In Figure 3.3(a),
the parameter cifs.unix_security is a parameter designed for handling a speial ase in COMP-A's storage
systems. The permission of les would be lost if the les that originally have some UNIX permissions
are opened and saved in Windows environment. If this parameter is set with on, the lose of permission
information an be avoided. To preserve the UNIX permission information, users only need to be aware of
this parameter and no other parameters will aet this parameter. Figure 3.3(b) demonstrates a ase how
the name-based virtual host needs to be ongured in Apahe web server. In order to ongure a name-
based virtual host, minimally two parameters (or diretives) NameVirtualHost and VirtualHost need to be
ongured. NameVirtualHost speies the ip (plus optional port) on whih the name-based virtual hosts will
be on. VirtualHost speies the detail of eah virtual host. Both NameVirtualHost and VirtualHost need to
be ongured, otherwise virtual host will not work. Moreover, the ip address speied in NameVirtualHost
and VirtualHost should be idential. If they mismath, virtual host will not work as well.
cifs.unix_security  on
NameVirtualHost A
<VirtualHost A>
    …...
</VirtualHost>
(a) one parameter case                      from COMP-A
(b) multiple parameter case                 from Apache
Figure 3.3: One parameter ase v.s. multiple parameter ase.
In the real world, there are many oasions similar to the example shown in Figure 3.3(b). This reveals
a reality that for many onguration parameters, there are some relation onstraints for the value of these
parameters. The relation onstraints an be dened as follows:
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Relation onstraint the value of parameter B is a funtion f of the value of parameter A.
When the funtion f is an identity funtion, it means the parameter A and parameter B should point to
the same value. The funtion f is not neessarily just identity funtion. It an be any funtion. It ould be
that the value of parameter B should be a ertain times of that of parameter A or some other more omplex
funtions. Therefore, if these relation onstraints are not honored, value inonsisteny mistakes will happen.
It is obvious for any value inonsisteny ase, there must be at least two onguration parameters
involved, whih inrease the hanes for users to make mistakes espeially when they are not aware of these
relation onstraints. This an be viewed as onguration vulnerabilities. They are similar to the general
software vulnerability that inurs remote attaks and exploits.
Figure 3.4 shows six value inonsisteny ases. Based on the sope of the onguration les, we an
further lassify these inonsisteny errors into two ategories. One ategory is Loal where the relation
onstraint is dened on the parameters within one onguration le for an appliation. Figure 3.4(a), (b),
and () belong to this ategory and only one onguration le is involved in those examples. The other
ategory is Remote where the relation onstraint is dened on the parameters loated in the onguration
les from dierent appliations, or even on dierent mahines. Figure 3.4(d), (e), and (f) belong to this
ategory.
We an also look at these ases from another perspetive. If we lassify them based on the harateristis
of the onstraints, we an have the following ategories:
Textually same The values of the parameters should be textually same (e.g., same ip address) or they
share some textually ommon part.
Cooperative To enable some feature, the values of parameters need to stay in a ooperative way.
Numerial There is some numerial relation between the values of parameters. The relation ould be  less
than, within ertain range, A should be four times of B , et.
Others The onstraint whih is dierent from the above three.
Therefore, Figure 3.4(a), (e), and (f) belongs to textually same. Figure 3.4(b) and () t in the ategories
of ooperative. Figure 3.4(d) is one example of numerial, more speially,  less than.
The key to detet these inonsisteny errors are those relation onstraints. However, developers may not
implement the heks against these relation onstraints when they are writing ode. We guess there ould
be multiple reasons.
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Order Allow, Deny
Allow from xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
Deny from All
Overwrite Allow
From 
(c) Value Inconsistency 3                                  from Apache
Description:  the rule “Deny from All”  actually 
disables the previous rule “Allow from …”.
Impact: the intended access rule does not work.
log_output="Table"
log=query.log
"log=" contradicts 
with "log_ouput="
Impact: log is written to table rather than file.
(b) Value Inconsistency 2                                  from MySQL
Description: The parameter "log_output" controls 
how log is stored (in file or database table). The user 
wanted to store log in file query.log, but "log_output" 
was incorrectly set to store log in database table.
(a) Value Inconsistency 1                                 from Apache
Description: when setting name based virtual host, 
the parameter VirtualHost should be set to the same
host as NameVirtualHost does. However, the user 
set NameVirtualHost to be "*.80" while set 
VirtualHost to be "*".
"*.80" does not 
match  with the "*" 
in <VirtualHost ...>
Impact: Apache loads virtual host in a wrong order.
NameVirtualHost *:80
<VirtualHost *>
    …...
</VirtualHost>
(f) Value Inconsistency 6                                  from Apache
Description: the server changed its hostname, while 
the iscsi config still uses the old hostname server01 
to construct its initiator name.
Impact: the storage server cannot be connected.
hosts file of the server  
xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx  server1
… … 
The config of iscsi
InitiatorName iqn:server01
Hostname updated 
to server1. the old 
value was server01
Still use the old 
value in initiator’s 
name
Impact: "too many connections" error generated.
The max allowed 
persistent connections 
specified in php is 
larger than the max 
connection specified 
in mysql
Description: when using persistent connections,  the 
mysql.max_persistent in PHP should be no larger 
than the max_connections in MySQL. User did not 
conform to this constraint.
(d) Value Inconsistency 4                                 from MySQL
mysql's config 
max_connections = 300
…... 
php's config 
mysql.max_persistent = 400
server 1's config 
ServerID 1
ServerID 2
… … 
server 2's config 
ServerID 1
ServerID 2
Missining “ServerID 2”
Missining “ServerID 1”
(e) Value Inconsistency 5                           from OpenLDAP
Description: when configuring mirror mode, both 
server ids need to be in both servers’ config file. The 
user failed to do that.
Impact: some data is not replicated.
Figure 3.4: Some value-based inonsisteny mistake examples.
Developers ould forget to add the heks, ould hoose to not add the hek due to some design on-
siderations or even developers themselves are not aware of suh relation onstraints. It ould also be due
to the mismath of design speiation and the atual implementation. On the other side, though some of
these onstraints are doumented in the software manual, the developers an not require users to read every
word of the manual. It is a truth that people still make mistakes even though some onstraints are indeed
lying in the manual.
Sometimes some onstraints are not doumented and beome hidden onstraints whih might only be
aware of by some administrator gurus. Even worse, the manual ould be wrong about some onstraints. In
Apahe's onguration manual, the entry Options is said to be possible to be ongured under the ontext
of the virtual host diretive. However, in the soure ode Options will be ignored if it is ongured under
the ontext of the virtual host diretive. This is apparently against the manual.
This suggests we should not merely rely on human and manuals. Instead, tools that automatially extrat
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and hek these onstraints will be highly preferred. To build suh tools, it is good to know the distribution
of all these onstraint violations. Table 3.6 just provides suh information.
System Textually Same Cooperative Numerial Other
COMP-A 44 15 9 5
CentOS 2 3 0 1
MySQL 4 1 1 1
Apahe 3 2 1 1
OpenLDAP 3 3 0 0
Table 3.6: The relation onstraints violated in the appliations we examined.
The majority (56.6%) of value inonsisteny mistakes that we examined violate the textually same
onstraint. For this type of mistakes, it might be possible to extrat these onstraints by using a simple
heuristi. The heuristi is that the parameters that have the same values textually or share some ommon
part textually may have ertain relations. Then we an group them together. This heuristi works well
for the parameters whose values are ip address, host names, le paths, et. Among all the violation to the
textually same onstraint, 58.9% (33 out of 56) of the ases are related to suh type of parameters. With a
large amount of onguration les obtained, data mining tehniques ould extrat these types of onstraints
with a low false positive rate. For the rest of the textually same' violations, the parameter involved usually
have value type as enum or integer. The previous heuristi may not work for these ases. The small value
spae may introdue ollision whih is onsidered as false positive. For example, many parameters with
enum type an have the same value as Yes or No, whih does not mean these parameters are related to
eah other.
Beside using tehniques like data mining, we an also leverage program analysis to extrat the onstraint.
The assumption here is if there is some relation between parameters, the relation should be reeted in soure
ode in ertain ways.
   if (opt_logname && !(log_output_options & LOG_FILE)
    &&!(log_output_options & LOG_NONE))
    {  ……  }
 
From MySQL mysqld.c
Figure 3.5: A ode snippet in MySQL whih is related to 3.4(b). Here the variables in bold are the
orresponding variables of parameter log_output and log.
As shown in Figure 3.5, for the two parameters log_output and log that have a relation between eah
other, their orresponding variables in the soure ode are atually in the ondition of the same if lause. This
is just one type of the soure ode patterns. There might be many other soure ode patterns whih suggest
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the relations between parameters. However, program analysis is diult to be applied aross appliations.
Table 3.7 reveals that among all value-based inonsisteny mistakes, 74.7% (74 out of 99) of them involve
multiple appliations. Therefore, for these mistakes, more sophistiated tehniques may need to be studied.
Apps Loal Remote Total
COMP-A 11 62 73
CentOS 2 4 6
MySQL 4 3 7
Apahe 5 2 7
OpenLDAP 3 3 6
Total 25 74 99
Table 3.7: The sope of value inonsisteny mistakes for all the examined appliations. Loal
means the related parameters are just within the onguration les of the same appliation. Remote means
they are aross appliations.
3.5.4 Software Inompatibility
Besides parameter-related mistakes, software inompatibility is another major ause of misongurations
(up to 18.3%, see Table 3.3). A omplex software system involves multiple inter-dependent omponents with
dierent versions. Software inompatibility issues refer to improper ombinations of omponents or their
versions. They ould be aused by inompatible libraries, appliations or even operating system kernels. For
example, in one of the studied ases, the user failed to install the mod_proxy_html  module beause the
existing  libxml2  library was not ompatible with this module.
In another example, a user annot make the PHP LDAP extension work beause of one inompatible
library. To install PHP LDAP extension on Windows is a multi-step proess and missing any one of them
will ause a failure. The mistake this user made was that the one of dynami-link libraries, php_ldap.dll,
was not the thread-safe version while other existing libraries were.
One way to deal with software ompatibility issues is better software pakaging. For example, mod-
ern software pakage management systems, suh as RPM [12℄ and Debian dpkg [3℄, automatially detet
inompatible or missing dependenies and update them. This may work well for systems with a standard
pakage. For systems that require multiple appliations from dierent vendors to work together, it is more
hallenging.
An alternative to pakage management systems is self-ontained pakaging, i.e. integrating dependent
omponents into one installation pakage and minimizing the requirements on the target system. To further
redue dependenies, one ould deliver a system as virtual mahine images (e.g., Amazon Mahine Image
running in Amazon EC2) or applianes (e.g., COMP-A's storage systems or Google Searh Appliane). The
latter may even eliminate hardware ompatibility issues.
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There have been attempts on improving software ompatibility by testing software in dierent sys-
tems [105, 22℄, but it seems few proposed tehniques have been used in real world. For omplex systems,
support matries [5, 4℄ are used to guide ongurations. Support matries are douments that enumerate
aeptable ombinations of ompatible omponents.
One may think that system upgrades are more likely to ause software inompatibility issues, but our
study found that only 11.3% of the software inompatibility issues are aused by system upgrades. One of
the possible reasons is that people already put great eort to assure software upgrades proeed properly.
For example, COMP-A oers a tool alled Upgrade Advisor [97℄ to help upgrade. It reates an easy-to-
understand report of all known ompatibility issues, and reommends ways to resolve them.
3.5.5 Component Misonguration
Component misongurations are onguration errors that are neither parameter mistakes nor ompatibility
issues. 8.3%∼14.5% of our examined misongurations are of this ategory. Here we further lassify them
into the following ve subtypes based on root auses:
Missing omponent Certain omponents (modules or libraries) are missing.
Plaement Certain les or omponents are not in the plae expeted by the system.
File format The format of ertain le is not aeptable to the system (For example, an Apahe web server
on a Linux host annot load a onguration le beause it is in the MS-DOS format with unreognized
new line haraters).
Insuient resoure The available resoures are not enough to support the system funtionality (e.g.,
not enough disk spae).
Stale data Stale data in the system do not support the new onguration.
Subtype Number of Cases
Missing omponent 15(25.9%)
Plaement 13(22.4%)
File format 3(5.2%)
Insuient resoure 15(25.7%)
Stale data 3(5.2%)
Others 9(15.5%)
Table 3.8: Subtypes of omponent misongurations.
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of the subtypes of omponent misongurations. Missing omponent,
plaement and insuient resoure are the three major auses.
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A missing omponent an prevent the funtionality that depends on this omponent from working or
even prevent the whole system from starting. Sometimes due to resoure limitation, not all modules are
loaded or installed at the rst plae. For example, some modules are loaded on demand to save memory.
But regardless whether the user will use ertain features or not, it is always reommended to hek if all the
required modules are present and issue warnings if some of them are missing. A better alternative is that
the system will automatially load the omponent and then ontinue.
File plaement is also needed to be wathed. It reates issues for some appliations where the position
of ertain kind of les are ritial. For example, if the data les and log les of a database are not plaed
properly, performane an be greatly aeted. For this kind of problems, the heking of suh onstraints
should be fored at the rst plae.
Besides, it is good to monitor the utilization of disk spae and give warning when spae is lose to full.
But a more fundamental way is to have stressing testing speially on the environment with little free disk
spae before the shipment of the software. This is espeially important and beneial for storage systems.
The three stale data ases all aused severe problems: The two MySQL ases are that user ould not log
in after reinstallation beause the authentiation of previous installation was not deleted; the one COMP-A
ase was that a disk was added to a new ler with the undeleted ownership information. Those information
aused the storage system not work orretly.
3.5.6 Mistake Loation
When diagnosing misonguration problems, one tends to fous on the target appliation (i.e the appliation
where the rst symptom is observed). However, we nd that misonguration problems an atually be
loated outside of the target appliation. We ategorize the misonguration ases where the error is loated
outside of the target appliation as follows:
OS-FS Cases where the error is loated in le system, inluding le system apaity, le/diretory permis-
sion, le/diretory loation, et.
OS-Module Cases where the error is loated in operating system modules, inluding kernel modules, se-
urity modules (suh as SELinux), et.
Network Cases where the error is loated in network onguration, inluding IP table, IP/hostname on-
guration, rewall onguration, et.
Other appliation Cases where the error is loated in other appliations or libraries.
54
Environment other environment like DNS servie.
System Inside FS OS-Module Network Other App Environment Others
COMP-A 132(42.7±3.0%) 23(7.4±1.6%) 3(1.0±0.6%) 53(17.2±2.3%) 82(26.5±2.7%) 5(1.6±0.8%) 11(3.6±1.1%)
CentOS 26(43.3±4.0%) 2(3.3±1.4%) 12(20.0±3.2%) 4(6.7±2.0%) 11(18.3±3.1%) 2(3.3±1.4%) 3(5.0±1.8%)
MySQL 27(49.1±3.2%) 10(18.2±2.5%) 6(10.9±2.0%) 1(1.8±0.9%) 6(10.9±2.0%) 4(7.3±1.7%) 1(1.8±0.9%)
Apahe 47(78.3±3.1%) 3(5.0±1.7%) 3(5.0±1.7%) 3(5.0±1.7%) 3(5.0±1.7%) 0 1(1.7±1.0%)
OpenLDAP 39(62.9±3.4%) 2(3.2±1.3%) 1(1.6±0.9%) 0 17(27.4±3.3%) 1(1.6±0.9%) 2(3.2±1.3%)
Table 3.9: The loation of errors.
Table 3.9 shows the distribution of onguration error loations. Naturally, most misongurations are
ontained in the target appliation itself. However, many misongurations also span to plaes beyond the
appliation. The administrators also need to onsider other parts of the system, inluding le system permis-
sions/apaities, operating system modules, other appliations running in the system, network onguration,
et. So looking at only the appliation itself is not enough to diagnose and x many onguration errors.
Finding: Although most misongurations are loated within eah examined
appliation, a signiant portion (21.7%∼57.3%) involve ongurations beyond
the appliation itself or span over multiple hosts.
3.5.7 Hardware Misonguration
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1, onguration errors also ontains hardware misongurations. In previous
setions, we had studied the misongurations manifested at software layer. In this setion, we briey disuss
the misongurations ourred at hardware layer.
For simple systems, issues that relate to hardware ongurations are seldom reported, sine these systems
are usually running on a higher layer so that they rarely need to worry about the interation with hardware.
Therefore, we just foused on the hardware misonguration from COMP-A.
From the 1000 ases that we sampled from COMP-A's ustomer issue database, we found 26 hardware
misonguration ases. The amount is at the similar level with Software Inompatibility and Component
Misonguration (32 and 31, respetively). These ases an be further lassied into three ategories:
Not supported devie Certain devie is not supported in urrent onguration (e.g., a speial network
ard is not supported in ertain type of motherboard).
Wrong slots/abling A devie is plugged into a wrong slot on the mainboard or the interonnetion (e.g.,
network able) is inorretly onneted.
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Wrong onguration There are no unsupported devie or inorret abling, but ertain hardware ong-
uration is not set in a right way. These are the ongurations that an only be adjusted at hardware
layer (e.g., a button is not on the right position).
Subtype Number of Cases
Unsupported Devie 12(46.1%)
Wrong Slots/Cabling 10(38.5%)
Wrong Conguration 4(15.4%)
Table 3.10: Subtypes of hardware misongurations in COMP-A.
As shown in Table 3.10, lose to half (46.1%) of the hardware miongurations from COMP-A are
problems with unsupported devies. Many of suh ases are due to the use of some unsupported hard disks.
We also observed ases suh as unsupported network swith and system ards. Though they aount for the
big part of hardware misongurations, for most of them (75.0%), expliit error messages that pinpoint the
root ause of the failures will be generated when these misongurations are observed. Therefore it is easy
for support engineers to handle suh failures.
38.5% of the hardware miongurations from COMP-A are due to putting devies in wrong slots or
inorret abling. Comparing to unsupported devies, these are more diult to diagnose. Only for 20% of
them, we will see expliit error messages about the root ause. Among these ases, wrong abling is a more
severe problem. With the prevalene of data enters, the interonnetion in data enters will be extremely
omplex with lots of network ables. All of them are needed to be onneted by human. Human errors
are highly likely onsidering suh sale. When wrong abling happens, it also takes a lot of human eort
to resolve. Some support engineers from COMP-A omplained to us that the wrong abling is usually the
hardest ase that they had enountered in the eld. To solve this problem, it is good to design some detetion
logi into the hardware so that the onnetion of abling an be easily inspeted. Therefore, misabling ould
be alerted automatially.
Besides, a small portion (15.4%) of ases are due to that some buttons or swithes are not in right
position. Developers an try to expose the status of these hardware knobs to the upper level software
layer. Then we an build some detetor to ath these mistakes.
3.6 System Reation to Misonguration
In this setion, we examine system reations to misongurations, fousing on whether the system detets
the misonguration and on the error messages issued by the system.
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3.6.1 Do Systems Detet and Report Conguration Errors?
Proative detetion and informative reporting an help diagnose misongurations more easily. Therefore,
we wish to understand whether systems detet and report onguration errors. We divide the examined ases
into three ategories based on how well the system handles onguration errors (Table 3.11). Cases where
the systems and assoiated tools detet, report, reover from (or helps the user orret) misongurations
may not be reported by users. Therefore, the results in this setion may be espeially skewed by our available
data. Nevertheless, there are interesting ndings that arise from this analysis.
System
Pinpoint Indeterminate Quiet
Unknown
Reation Reation Failure
COMP-A 48(15.5±2.2%) 153(49.5±3.0%) 74(23.9±2.6%) 34(11.0±1.9%)
CentOS 7(11.7±2.4%) 33(55.0±3.7%) 16(26.7±3.3%) 4(6.7±1.9%)
MySQL 4(7.2±1.7%) 26(47.3±3.2%) 13(23.6±2.8%) 12(21.8±2.7%)
Apahe 8(13.3±2.6%) 28(46.7±3.8%) 16(26.7±3.4%) 8(13.3±2.6%)
OpenLDAP 9(14.5±2.6%) 28(45.2%±3.7%) 14(22.6±3.1%) 11(17.7±2.8%)
Table 3.11: The number of ases in eah ategory of system reation.
System
Mysterious Symptoms
w/o Message
COMP-A 26(8.4±1.7%)
CentOS 4(6.7±1.9%)
MySQL 9(16.4±2.4%)
Apahe 3(5.0±1.7%)
OpenLDAP 3(4.8±1.5%)
Table 3.12: The number of ases that ause mysterious rashes, hangs, et. but do not provide
any messages.
We lassify system reations into pinpoint reation, indeterminate reation, and quiet failure.
A pinpoint reation is one of the best system reations to misongurations. The system not only detets
a onguration error but also pinpoints the exat root ause in the error message (see a COMP-A example
in Figure 3.6). As shown in Table 3.11, more than 85% of the ases do not belong to this ategory, indiating
systems may not reat in a user-friendly way to misongurations. As previously disussed, the study
inludes only reported ases. Therefore some misongurations with good error messages may have already
been solved by users themselves and thus not reported. So in reality, the perentage of pinpoint reation to
misonguration may be higher. However, onsidering the total number of misongurations in the soures
we seleted is very large, there are still a signiant number of misongurations for whih the examined
systems do not pinpoint the misongurations.
An indeterminate reation is a reation that a system does provide some information about the failure
symptoms (i.e., manifestation of the misonguration), but does not pinpoint the root ause or guide the
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 from COMP-A
Symptom: the user cannot create new directories in 
directory /vol/vol1/xxx/data
Error message:
[COMP-A – dir.size.max:warning]:
Directory /vol/vol1/xxx/data/ reached 
the maxdirsize Limit. Reduce the number 
of files or use the vol options command 
to increase this limit
Root cause: the number of existing files in that 
directory /vol/vol1/xxx/data/ 
Figure 3.6: A misonguration ase where the error message pinpoints the root ause and tells
the user how to x it.
user on how to x the problem. 45.2%∼55.0% of our studied ases belong to this ategory.
A quiet failure refers to ases where the system does not funtion properly, and it further does not provide
any information regarding the failure or the root ause. 22.6%∼26.7% of the ases belong to this ategory.
Diagnosing them is very diult.
Finding: 7.2%∼15.5% of the studied misonguration problems provide expliit
messages that pinpoint the onguration error.
Things an be even worse when the misonguration auses the system to misbehave in a mysterious
way (rash, hang, et.) just like software bugs. We found that in most systems, this ours in 5%∼8% of
the ases we studied (Table 3.12).
Why would misongurations ause a system to rash or hang unexpetedly? The reason is intuitive:
sine onguration parameters an also be onsidered as a form of input, if a system does not perform
validity heking and prepare for illegal ongurations, it may lead to system misbehavior. We desribe two
suh senarios below.
Crash example: a web appliation used both mod_python and mod_wsgi modules in Apahe httpd
server. These two modules used two dierent versions of Python, whih aused segmentation fault errors
when trying to aess the web page.
Hang example: a server was ongured to authentiate via LDAP with the hard bind poliy, whih
made it keep onneting to the LDAP server until it sueeded. However, the LDAP server was not working,
so the server hung when the user added new aounts.
Suh misbehavior is very hallenging to diagnose beause users and support engineers may suspet these
unexpeted failures to have been aused by a bug in the system instead of a onguration issue (of ourse,
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one may argue that, in a way it an also be onsidered to be a bug). If the system is built to perform more
thorough onguration validity-heking and avoid misonguration-aused misbehavior, both the ost of
support and the diagnosis time an be redued.
Finding: Some misongurations have aused the systems to rash, hang or
have severe performane degradation, making failure diagnosis a hallenging task.
We further studied if there is ertain orrelation between the type of misonguration and the diulty
for systems to reat. We alulated the ratio of ases that have pinpoint reation to the total ases in eah
type of misongurations. The result shows it is more diult to have appropriate reation for software
inompatibility issues. Only 9.3% of all the inompatibility issues have pinpoint reation, while the same
ratio for parameter mistakes and omponent misongurations is 14.3% and 15.5% respetively. This result
is reasonable sine global knowledge (e.g., the onguration of dierent appliations) is often required to
deide if there are inompatibility issues.
3.6.2 System Reation to Illegal Parameters
Cases with illegal onguration parameters (dened inChapter 3.5.2) are usually easier to be heked and
pinpointed automatially.
System
Pinpoint Indeterminate Quiet
Unknown
Reation Reation Failure
COMP-A 25(18.9%) 57(43.2%) 27(20.5%) 23(17.4%)
CentOS 4(25.0%) 7(43.8%) 5(31.3%) 0
MySQL 1(4.3%) 13(56.5%) 3(13.0%) 6(26.1%)
Apahe 5(21.7%) 9(39.1%) 4(17.4%) 5(21.7%)
OpenLDAP 7(26.9%) 11(42.3%) 4(15.4%) 4(15.4%)
Table 3.13: How do systems reat to illegal parameters? The reation ategory is the same as in
Table 3.11.
However, we found that systems do not detet and pinpoint a majority of these onguration mistakes,
as shown in Table 3.13.
Finding: Among 220 ases with illegal parameters that ould be easily deteted
and xed, only 4.3%∼26.9% of them provide expliit messages. Up to 31.3% of
them do not provide any message at all, unneessarily ompliating the diagnosis
proess.
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3.6.3 Impat of Messages on Diagnosis Time
Do good error messages help engineers diagnose misonguration problems more eiently? To answer this
question, we alulated the diagnosis time, in the unit of hours, from the time when a misonguration
problem was posted to the time when the orret answer was provided. Table 3.14 summarizes the data.
System
Expliit Ambiguous
No Message
Message Message
COMP-A 1x 13x 14.5x
CentOS 1x 3x 5.5x
MySQL 1x 3.4x 1.2x
Apahe 1x 10x 3x
OpenLDAP 1x 5.3x 2.5x
Table 3.14: The median of diagnosis time for ases with and without messages (time is normal-
ized for ondentiality reasons). Expliit message means that the error message diretly pinpoints
the loation of the misonguration. The median diagnosis time of the ases with expliit messages is used
as base. Impliit message means there are messages but they do not diretly identify the misonguration.
No message is for ases where no messages are provided.
Table 3.14 presents that the misonguration ases with expliit messages are diagnosed muh faster,
with the median of diagnosis time of less than 4 hours. Otherwise, engineers have to spend muh more time
on diagnosis, where the median of the diagnosis time is up to 14.5 times longer.
Finding: Messages that pinpoint onguration errors an shorten the diagnosis
time 3 to 13 times as ompared to the ases with ambiguous messages or 1.2 to
14.5 times as ompared to the ases with no messages.
To improve error reporting, two types of approahes an be adopted. A white-box approah [108℄, uses
program analysis to identify the state that should be aptured at eah logging statement in soure ode to
minimize ambiguity in error messages. When soure ode is not available, a blak-box approah, suh as
Clarify [45℄, an be taken instead. Clarify assoiates the program's runtime prole with ambiguous error
report, whih enables improved error reporting.
Interestingly, for some of the systems (Apahe, MySQL and OpenLDAP), engineers seem to spend more
time (2∼4 times longer) diagnosing ases with ambiguous messages than ases with no messages at all.
There are several potential reasons. First, inorret or irrelevant messages an sometimes mislead engineers,
direting them down a wrong path. Figure 3.7 shows suh an example. Based on the message provided by
the lient, both the support engineers and the ustomers thought the problem was on the lient end, so they
made several attempts to set ertiates, but the root ause turned out to be a problem in the onguration
on the server side. This indiates that the auray of messages is ritial to the diagnosis proess. Providing
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misleading messages may be worse than providing nothing at all.
 from COMP-A
Symptom: When the user tried to connect the admin 
web site, the web browser (Firefox) threw a misleading 
error message asking for new certificate.
Error message:
You have received an invalid certificate. 
Please contact the administrator and get 
a new certificate containing a unique 
serial number.
(error code: sec_error_reused_issuer)
Root cause: The "httpd.admin.ssl.enable" parameter 
was set to be “on” in a COMP-A server.
Figure 3.7: A misonguration ase where the error message misled the ustomer and the
support engineers.
Seond, in some ases, symptoms and onguration le ontent are already suient for support engineers
or experts to resolve the problem. For these ases, whether there are error messages is less important. For
example, many ases from MySQL related to performane degradation do not have error messages, but it
was relatively easy for experts to solve those problems by looking at only onguration le. However, even
for these ases, if the system ould give good quality messages, users ould have solved the problems by
themselves.
Finding: Giving an irrelevant message may be worse than not giving message at
all for diagnosing misonguration. Some irrelevant messages ould mislead users
to hase down the wrong path. In three of the ve studied systems, statisti data
shows that ambiguous messages may lead to longer diagnosis time ompared to
not having any message.
We further did a preliminary study on what kind of error messages are more useful in reduing diagnosis
time. Speially, we read through the misonguration ases that have expliit messages and are parameter
mistakes (a total of 62 ases). Besides that all these ases pinpoint the root ause of the failure (whih is our
denition of expliit), 69.4% of them further mention the parameter name in the message; 6.5% of even
further point out the parameter's loation within the onguration le. However, we did not nd strong
orrelation between the diagnosis time and these extra information (e.g., parameter name) in the expliit
messages. A more omprehensive study on this topi will remain as our future work.
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3.7 Causes of Misongurations
3.7.1 When Did Misongurations Happen?
There are many ways to look at the reasons to misonguration. Here, we examined only a ouple of them.
Misonguration problems ould happen when the user uses (or ongures) a feature for the rst time, or
when a previous working feature does not work any more. Based on this, we ategorized the misonguration
ases into two ategories (Table 3.15):
Used-to-work The system used to work but does not work any more due to various hanges.
First-time use The misonguration happens at the user's rst attempt to aess ertain funtionality.
System Used-to-Work First-Time Use Unknown
COMP-A 100(32.4±2.8%) 165(53.4±3.0%) 44(14.2±2.1%)
CentOS 10(16.7±3.0%) 40(66.6±3.8%) 10(16.7±3.0%)
MySQL 3(5.5±1.5%) 45(81.8±2.5%) 7(12.7±2.2%)
Apahe 2(3.3±1.4%) 40(66.7±3.6%) 18(30.0±3.5%)
OpenLDAP 2(3.2±1.3%) 57(91.9±1.6%) 3(4.8±1.6%)
Table 3.15: The number of misongurations ategorized by used-to-work and rst-time use.
There are ases that we do not have adequate information to deide whih ategory it belongs. We
marked those ases as Unknown.
One may think that most misongurations happen when users ongure a system for the rst time.
As our results show, it is indeed the ase for relatively simple systems (MySQL, Apahe and OpenLDAP).
The ause for the misongurations during First-time use an be the inadequate knowledge of personnel.
Therefore users made some mistakes and the system beome misongured. The potential solution for this
types of ases ould be have better training of the personnel, building better knowledge base so users an
easily look up, or designing hekers whih an detet some onguration errors before running the system.
A more fundamental way is to have novel design of ongurations that is of low omplexity and really
easy-to-use. Sometimes, there is no problem with user but with the user manuals. There are indeed some
manuals whih ontains inonsistent ontent [86℄. We also found some manuals have ertain wrong entries
(as disussed in Chapter 3.5.3). User may make mistake when following these wrong manuals.
However, for more omplex systems, COMP-A and CentOS, a signiant portion (16.7%∼32.4%) of the
misongurations atually happen in the middle of the system's lifetime. There ould be two major reasons.
First, these systems have muh more frequent hanges (upgrades, reonguration, et.) in their lifetime.
Seond, the onguration is more ompliated so it takes a long time for users to master.
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Finding: For simpler systems, the majority of misongurations are related to
rst-time use of ertain funtionality. For more omplex and larger systems, a
signiant perentage (16.7%∼32.4%) of the misongurations were introdued
into systems that used to work ne.
3.7.2 Why Does My System Stop Working?
To further zoom into the auses for the used-to-work ases, we ategorized the 100 ases of this ategory
from COMP-A based on their root auses (Figure 3.8).
Software 
Upgrade
16%
Collateral Damage
29%
Incomplete 
Maintenace
12%
Hardware
Change
18%
Exhaustion 
Resource
14%
External 
Environment
8%
Configuration Corrupted 
   by Outage 3%
Figure 3.8: The ause distribution for the used-to-work misongurations at COMP-A.
Collateral damage refers to ases when users made onguration hanges for some new funtional-
ity but aidentally broke existing funtionality. It aounts for 29.0% of the used-to-work ases from
COMP-A. To avoid suh ollateral damages, it might be useful if users an be warned by the onguration
management/hange tool about the side-eets of their hanges.
Inomplete maintenane refers to ases when some regular maintenane tasks introdued onguration
hanges breaking existing funtionality. 12.0% of the used-to-work ases from COMP-A belong to this
ategory. For example, when an administrator does a routine periodi password hange to ertain aounts
but forgets to propagate it to all aeted systems, some systems would not be able to authentiate these
aounts.
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Correct config before upgrade 
/data -actual=/vol/data,sec=sys,rw
… … 
Correct config after upgrade
/data /vol/data,sec=sys,rw
… … 
 from COMP-A
Before upgrade, 
-actual option is 
supported
description: the -actual option that is used to show the 
actual path being displayed is not supported any more 
after upgrade.
impact: a share can not be mounted.
After upgrade, -actual 
option is not supported
Figure 3.9: A misonguration example where the syntax of onguration les has hanged
after upgrade. A previously working NFS mounting onguration is no longer valid, beause the option
atual beame depreated after upgrade.
In addition, onguration ould also be orrupted by outage (3.0%) or be modied aidentally by some
(2.0%) of software upgrades (Figure 3.8). To sum up, 46% of the used-to-work misonguration ases
from COMP-A are aused by onguration parameter hanges due to various reasons inluding onguring
other features, routine maintenane, system outages, or software upgrades. To diagnose and x these ases,
it is useful for systems to automatially keep trak of onguration hanges [97℄, and even better, help users
to pinpoint whih hange is the ulprit like in [103℄.
Another major ause is hardware hange (18.0%). When ustomers upgrade, replae or reorganize
hardware (e.g., moving a disk from one server to another), it an ause problems if they forget to hange
related onguration parameters aordingly.
Resoure exhaustion (14.0%) an also aet a previously working system. For example, in one of the
studied ases, a database system hung and did not work properly even after rebooting beause the data
disks beame full.
Moreover, external environment hanges ould also be harmful to previously working systems. They
aount for 8.0% of used-to-work ases from COMP-A. For example, in one of the studied ases, a system
suered from severe performane degradation beause its primary DNS server went oine aidentally. Suh
hanges are error-prone and problemati, beause, in a data enter, typially dierent systems are managed
by dierent administrators who may not ommuniate with eah other in a timely manner about their
hanges.
Software upgrade, as one may expet, is another major ause of misongurations that break a pre-
viously working system. It aounts for 16% of the used-to-work ases from COMP-A. We further sub-
ategorize it into three types. First, a new software release may have hanged the onguration le syntax
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Conguration Syntax Conguration Inompatible
Total
Being Changed Being Modied Upgrade
5% 2% 9% 16%
Table 3.16: The breakdown of used-to-work misonguration ases from COMP-A aused by
software upgrade. Perentages are alulated based on the total number of used-to-work ases.
or format requirements, making the old onguration le invalid. Figure 3.9 gives suh an example. Se-
ond, some automati upgrade proesses may silently modify ertain onguration parameters (e.g. set them
to default values) without users' awareness. Third, software upgrades may ause inompatibilities among
omponents.
Addressing the misonguration errors introdued by software upgrade requires the eorts from both
developers and users (administrators). On one hand, developers should test the inuene of the program
behavior hange on previous onguration. This an be ahieved by regression testing with dierent ombi-
nation of ongurations. Developers need also expliitly doument the hanges of the syntax of onguration
language and highlight them to the users. On the other hand, it may be a good pratie to keep a opy of
previous working onguration before upgrade in ase that the onguration might be messed up by upgrade.
Users may also need to be alert to the syntax hanges of onguration language. For the ompatibility issues,
users should make sure all the modules that need to be upgraded are atually upgraded. Systems should
provide automati upgrade tools or at least detailed upgrade instrutions [97, 34℄. The upgrade proess
should also take users' existing ongurations into onsideration.
Finding: By looking into the 100 used-to-work ases (32.4% of the total) at
COMP-A, 46% of them are attributed to onguration parameter hanges due to
routine maintenane, onguring for new funtionality, system outages, et, and
an benet from traking onguration hanges. The remainder are aused by non-
parameter related issues suh as hardware hanges (18%), external environmental
hanges (8%), resoure exhaustion (14%), and software upgrades(14%).
3.8 Impat of Misongurations
We analyzed the severity of ustomer-reported issues from COMP-A (Chapter 3.4) and found that a large
perentage (31%) of high-impat ustomer issues were related to system onguration. In this setion, we
analyze the severity of the spei misonguration ases used in our study, partiularly from the viewpoint
of system availability and performane. We divide the misonguration ases into three ategories, as shown
in Table 3.17: (1) the system beomes fully unavailable; (2) the system beomes partially unavailable, i.e.
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it annot deliver ertain desired features; and (3) the system suers from severe performane degradation.
We do expet the results to be skewed towards the more severe ases whih aused users to report them
more often than simpler ases.
System
Fully Partially Performane
Unavailable Unavailable Degradation
COMP-A 41 (13.3±2.1%) 247 (79.9±2.4%) 21 (6.8±1.5%)
CentOS 12 (20.0±3.2%) 47 (78.3±3.3%) 1 (1.7±1.0%)
MySQL 15 (27.3±2.9%) 29 (52.7±3.2%) 11 (20.0±2.6%)
Apahe 15 (25.0±3.3%) 44 (73.3±3.4%) 1 (1.7±1.0%)
OpenLDAP 6 (9.7±2.2%) 52 (83.9±2.7%) 4 (6.4±1.8%)
Table 3.17: The impat distribution of the misonguration ases from all the studied systems.
As the result shows, 9.7%∼27.3% of the misongurations ause the system to beome fully unavailable.
This demonstrates again that misonguration an be a very severe threat to system availability.
Moreover, up to 20.0% of the misongurations ause severe performane degradation, espeially for
systems suh as database servers that are performane sensitive and require some non-trivial tuning based
on users' partiular workloads, infrastruture, and data sizes. For example, the oial performane tuning
guides for MySQL and Orale have more than 400 pages, and mention tens, even hundreds of onguration
parameters that are related to performane. The ratio here might be an underestimation of performane
problems in the eld, sine some of trivial performane issues introdued by misonguration may not be
reported by the user.
Finding: Although most studied misonguration ases only lead to partial
unavailability of the system, 16.1%∼47.3% of them make the systems to be fully
unavailable or ause visible performane degradation.
The next question is whether dierent types of misongurations have dierent impat harateristis.
So we also examined the impat of eah type of misonguration and the results are shown in Table 3.18.
Misonguration Fully Partially Performane
Type Unavailable Unavailable Degradation
Parameters 59 (13.6%) 342 (78.8%) 33 (7.6%)
Compatibility 14 (25.9%) 38 (70.4%) 2 (3.7%)
Component 16 (27.6%) 39 (67.2%) 3 (5.2%)
Table 3.18: The impat on dierent types of misonguration ases. The data is aggregated for all
the examined systems. The perentage shows the ratio of a spei type of misonguration (e.g., parameter
mistake) that lead to a spei impat level (e.g., full unavailability).
We found that, ompared to onguration parameter mistakes, software ompatibility and omponent
onguration errors are more likely to ause full unavailability of the system. 25.9% of the software ompat-
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ibility issues and 27.6% of the omponent onguration errors make systems fully unavailable, whereas this
ratio is only 13.6% for parameter-related misongurations.
The above results are not surprising beause what omponents are used and whether they are ompatible
an easily prevent systems from even being unable to start. In ontrast, onguration parameter mistakes,
espeially if the parameter is only for ertain funtionality, tend to have a muh more loalized impat.
In addition to having a more severe impat, ompatibility and omponent onguration mistakes an
be more diult to x. They usually require greater expertise from users. For example, in one of the
misonguration ases of CentOS, the user ould not mount a newly reated ReiserFS le system, beause
the kernel support for this ReiserFS le system was missing. The user needed to install a set of libraries and
kernel modules and also modify onguration parameters in several plaes to get it to work.
Finding: Software ompatibility and omponent onguration errors are more
likely to lead to full unavailability of the system, alling for more attention to
avoid ompatibility and omponent onguration issues.
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Chapter 4
Conlusion
System reliability and manageability are the two key problems that relate to system failures. Though
substantial advanement has been ahieved in improving system performane, the breakthrough in improving
system reliability and manageability has been less observed. With the trend that systems are beoming more
and more omplex, we will fae even more hallenges when ghting against system failures.
No matter oming up with intelligent tools to detet those errors or an innovative design to avoid
those faults fundamentally, it is important to rst understand the harateristis of those failures. Suh
a harateristis an serve as a lighthouse whih give navigation to both aademia and industry eorts on
solving the problem of system failures.
This thesis did a omprehensive study on inorret xes (i.e., buggy pathes) and misongurations. One
is a major ause to system reliability and the other is a big issue in system manageability. Both of them an
ause severe system failure, large nanial losses or even human ausality. In order to make our study as
omprehensive and omplete as possible, we sampled a large number of bug xes and ustomer (onguration
related) issues to guarantee the signiane in statistis. We also hose our samples from both open soure
systems and ommerial systems. These systems are all widely deployed and used and our samples are all
real system failures that happened in the eld.
For inorret xes, we studied their prevalene, the spei bug types that are more diult to x right,
the ommon mistake patterns during bug xing and the human fators that relate to inorret xes. Our
ndings demonstrate inorret x is indeed a signiant problem that should draw our attention. The
mistake patterns we found are very useful to build hekers that an eetively detet inorret xes. We
also found ode knowledge is an important fator that inuenes the quality of bug xing. The existing bug
xing/reviewing assignment is not always assigning the right person to do the xing and reviewing. Inspired
by our ndings, the ommerial software vendor whose OS ode we evaluated is building a tool to improve
the bug xing and ode reviewing proess.
For misongurations, we studied their ratio among all the ustomer issues, their dierent types, in-
luding both parameter mistakes and non-parameter mistakes. We also studied ertain misonguration
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patterns, how systems reat to a misonguration, the various auses of onguration errors and the impat
of misongurations. We found onguration related ases are very prevalent. Espeially for high severity
ases, onguration related ases are most reported. Most misongurations are due to parameter mistakes
but there are still sizable amount of non-parameter mistakes that should be handled. Value inonsisteny
mistakes is a frequently observed type among parameter mistakes. It exposes some vulnerability in system
manageability and it is easy for operator make suh mistakes. We also found the quality of error messages
that reat to misonguration is very ruial to the eay of diagnosis. We hope that our study helps
extend and improve tools that injet, detet, diagnose, or x misongurations. Further, we hope that the
study provides system arhitets, developers, and testers insights into onguration-logi design and testing,
and also enourages support personnel to reord eld onguration problems more rigorously so that vendors
an learn from historial mistakes.
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